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ABSTRACT 
  
A proposed theory explains how actors rely on subtle features of social 
context when deciding whether to contribute resources to the group and 
punish their partners after they behave selfishly. The theory incorporates 
elements of identity control theory with social exchange theory. It proposes 
that features of social context shape the perceptions of actors in groups. 
These perceptions, in turn, affect their behaviors and the formation of social 
solidarity between group members. Three experiments test elements of the 
proposed theory by varying the context in which actors viewed themselves, 
their partners, and the overall goals of their groups.  
The instructions for study 1 told groups of actors that they either had 
cooperative or competitive personality types. Study 2 referred to the partners 
of actors as either collaborators or competitors. Study 3 told actors the goals 
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of their groups were either defined by cooperation or competition. Each study 
assigned actors to the same group structure in which individuals completed a 
public goods game with opportunities to anonymously punish their partners. 
Results show that actors contributed more resources to their group, and spent 
fewer resources punishing their partners, when they viewed themselves or their 
partners as more cooperative than competitive. These behaviors, in turn, 
affected levels of trust, commitment, and cohesion that formed between group 
members. The context in which actors viewed the goals of their groups 
affected their contributions to these groups, but it did not significantly affect 
their punishment of partners. These patterns of behaviors also had negligible 
effects on social solidarity in groups. Thus, results from these experiments 
show that subtle features of the relational context (i.e. perceptions of self and 
partners) affect the means by which actors promote collective action in 
groups, shaping the formation of social solidarity between group members. 
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in 
Sociology 
2015 
 Advisory Committee: 
IDENTITY PROCESSES, SOCIAL CONTEXT, AND THE FORMATION OF 
SOCIAL SOLIDARITY IN GROUPS
by 
Marek N. Posard
Professor Jeffrey W. Lucas, Chair 
Professor Feinian Chen 
Professor Stanley Presser 




To my loving parents,  
Elaine and Phillip Posard 
!ii
Acknowledgements 
! I am grateful for a number of people who supported me throughout the 
years. Bruno Silva and Emily Dement worked diligently to help me collect 
data for my experiments as undergraduate research assistants. Gaye 
Bugenhagen, Mini Rajan, and Gerry Todd provided the necessary 
administrative support for this project. Without them, I would not have 
completed this project within a timely manner. 
 My dissertation committee was extraordinarily helpful during the 
proposal and final defense stages of this project. Feinian Chen taught me how 
to use rigorous statistics in my research. Carmi Schooler showed me the 
creativity that lies behind the mechanics of statistics. Stanley Presser taught 
me the importance of situating the analysis of data within the broader 
literature. Kathryn Bartol’s insight as the Dean’s representative was 
invaluable. My dissertation is better because of the contributions from these 
committee members. 
 I also am thankful for my friends and mentors at Loyola University 
Chicago. John Allen Williams was an exemplary mentor to me at Loyola and 
encouraged me to pursue graduate school in the first place. My friend Mary 
Frances Lebamoff helped me to take action and begin the application process. 
Alexandru Grigorescu and Christopher Manning were generous with their 
time and support when I decided to apply. I am grateful to David Segal from 
!iii
the University of Maryland who told me about this sociology program, 
encouraged me to apply, and mentored me in the first years of my studies.  
 I am most thankful to Jeff Lucas. Words cannot begin to express Jeff’s 
impact on me both personally and professionally. He taught me what it means 
to be a sociologist. He was patient and kind in sharing his wealth of 
knowledge with me. Jeff taught me what it means to conduct high-quality 
research, how to communicate it clearly to others, while still being a 
consummate professional.  My hope is that I can be the same type of mentor 
to a student as Jeff has been to me throughout these years. 
 I also am grateful for the love and support of my immediate family. My 
father, Phillip, always encouraged me to be a lifetime learner. My mother, 
Elaine, is the smartest person that I know. Her unconditional love is more 
than a son could ever ask for in life. I also am thankful for my sister and 
brother - Brooke and Tad - for their support.  
 Lastly, I owe an indelible debt to my wife, Nicole. She has been nothing 
short of kind, supportive, and patient with me throughout my graduate 
career.  I am a better person for being with Nicole and I continue to learn 
something from her mind and spirit each and every day of my life. Without 





Table of Contents v .............................................................................................
List of Tables vii ..................................................................................................
List of Figures viii ................................................................................................
Chapter 1: Introduction 1 ....................................................................................
Chapter 2: Social Exchange Theory 7 ..................................................................
Early Research 8 ..............................................................................................
Reciprocity Theory of Social Exchange 11 .......................................................
Affect Theory of Social Exchange 15 ...............................................................
Integrated Model of Social Exchange 18 ..........................................................
Social Exchange Heuristic 19 ...........................................................................
Conclusion 21 ...................................................................................................
Chapter 3: Identity Control Theory 23 ................................................................
Burke’s Identity Model of Network Exchange 25 .............................................
Social Context 28 .............................................................................................
Chapter 4: Theoretical Propositions and Predictions 31 .....................................
Scope Conditions 31 .........................................................................................
Propositions 31 .................................................................................................
Diagram of the Proposed Theory 36 ................................................................
Predictions 38 ..................................................................................................
Mediation Analyses 41 
Chapter 5:  Experimental Method 45 ..................................................................
Experimental Procedures 45 ............................................................................
Experimental Methods and Theory Building 50 ..............................................
Chapter 6:  Study 1 - Individual Context 52 .......................................................
Design and Participants 52 ..............................................................................
Manipulation and Procedures 52 .....................................................................
Dependent Measures 56 ...................................................................................
Punishment 63 .................................................................................................
Positive Affect 66 .............................................................................................
Social Solidarity 68 ..........................................................................................
Contributions and Punishment as Mediators 69 ..............................................
Alternative Explanation: Changing Personal Identities 72 ...............................
Discussion 74 ....................................................................................................
Chapter 7:  Study 2 - Relational Context  76 ......................................................
Design and Participants 76 ..............................................................................
Manipulation and Procedures 76 .....................................................................




Positive Affect 86 .............................................................................................
Social Solidarity 88 ..........................................................................................
Contributions and Punishment as Mediators 89 ..............................................
Alternative Explanation: Changing Personal Identities 92 ...............................
Discussion 92 ................................................................................................................
Chapter 8:  Study 3 - Group Context  94 ............................................................
Design and Participants 94 ..............................................................................
Dependent Measures 96 ...................................................................................
Generosity 99 ...................................................................................................
Punishment 102 ................................................................................................
Positive Affect 105 ...........................................................................................
Social Solidarity 107 .........................................................................................
Contributions and Punishment as Mediators 107 ............................................
Alternative Explanation: Changing Personal Identities 109 .............................
Discussion 109 ..................................................................................................
Chapter 9: Discussion 111 ....................................................................................
Facial Expressions of Emotions 116 .................................................................
Limitations 118 ................................................................................................
Chapter 10: Conclusion 120 .................................................................................
Future Research  121 ........................................................................................
Appendices 124 ....................................................................................................
Appendix A - Registration Materials 125 ........................................................
Appendix C - Study 1 Materials 133 ...............................................................
Appendix D - Study 2 Materials 147 ...............................................................
Appendix E - Study 3 Materials 154 ................................................................
Appendix F - Questionnaire 162 ......................................................................
References 173.....................................................................................................
!vi
List of Tables 
Table 6.1  T-Tests for Average Contributions to the Group
Table 6.2  T-Tests for Average Punishment of Partners
Table 6.3  Facial Expressions of Emotions by Personality Trait
Table 6.4  Means of Social Value Questions by Personality Trait
Table 7.1  T-Tests for Average Contributions to the Group
Table 7.2  T-Tests for Average Punishment of Partners
Table 7.3  Facial Expressions of Emotions by Partner Type
Table 7.4  Means of Social Value Questions by Partner Type
Table 8.1  T-Tests Predicting Average Generosity of Partners
Table 8.2  T-Tests for Average Punishment of Partners
Table 8.3  Facial Expressions of Emotions by Group Goal
Table 8.4  Means of Social Value Questions by Group Goal
"  vii
List of Figures 
Figure 4.1  The Proposed Theory of Context in Social Exchange
Figure 6.1  Fictitious Data Visualization from Personality Reports
Figure 6.2  Average Percent of Contributions to the Group by Personality Type
Figure 6.3  Average Percent of Punishment Toward Partners by Personality Type 
Figure 6.4  Means of Trust, Commitment, and Cohesion by Personality Type
Figure 6.5  Mediation Analysis for Group Contribution
Figure 6.6  Mediation Analysis for Punishment of Partners
Figure 7.1  Average Percent of Contributions to the Group by Partner Type
Figure 7.2  Average Percent of Punishment Toward Partners by Partner Type
Figure 7.3  Means of Trust, Commitment, and Cohesion by Partner Type
Figure 7.4  Mediation Analysis for Group Contributions
Figure 7.5  Mediation Analysis for Punishment of Partners
Figure 8.1  Logos for Looking Glass Incorporated
Figure 8.2  Average Percent of Contributions to the Group by Goal Type
Figure 8.3  Average Percent of Punishment  Toward Partners by Goal Type 
Figure 8.4  Means of Trust, Commitment, and Cohesion by Goal Type
"  viii
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Collective action is a means to get what one wants by working with 
others who also want the same thing (Olson 1971). How does social context 
affect the means by which actors promote collective action in groups of self-
interested people? It may lead actors to behave generously with the hope that 
beneficiaries of this behavior will do the same too (Irwin and Simpson 2013). 
Alternatively, context may cause actors to rely on punishment to discourage 
others from behaving selfishly (Yamagishi 1986). A proposed theory explains 
how the features of social context affect whether actors rely on generosity or 
punishment to promote collective action in groups. These behaviors, in turn, 
affect the formation of trust, commitment, and cohesion between group 
members. 
Social exchange theory assumes that actors begin group tasks with the 
same goal: to accumulate resources for themselves. The theory focuses on the 
incentives for actors that lead them to negotiate over resources with others in 
groups (Lawler and Thye 1999). Much of the theorizing on social exchange is 
concerned with instrumental resources that groups of actors transfer between 
each other over time. In recent decades, research has attended to the role of 
network structures that delimit who may interact with whom in groups. 
Experiments find that features of these networks affect the capacity for actors 
to gain resources during social exchange. The instrumental resources that 
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actors gain in groups also shape how they perceive their partners (e.g. trust 
and commitment) and the group (e.g. cohesion) as a whole (Kuwabara 2011; 
Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2008; Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007).  
Studies find that actors report higher levels of trust and commitment 
when they are more uncertain about the outcomes of social exchange (Molm 
et al. 2007). Other studies report that outcomes of social exchange deemed 
favorable by actors will evoke positive feelings within them (Lawler and Yoon 
1996). Features of network structures affect how actors come to understand 
these feelings, shaping the perceptions of solidarity in groups (Lawler, Thye, 
and Yoon 2000). More recently, research finds that perceptions of self and 
others are strong predictors of social solidarity among group members 
(Kuwabara 2011). 
With recent advances in social exchange theory, we now have a better 
understanding of the relationship between network forms, interpersonal 
behaviors, and perceptions of social solidarity by actors in groups. Theorizing 
by Molm et al. (2007) and Lawler (2001) have identified features of networks 
that affect the behaviors and perceptions of actors. Kuwabara’s (2011) 
research integrates both theories with a model that describes when features of 
context affect group dynamics, namely the affective and relational contexts. 
Given these advances, it may prove useful to focus some attention on how 
actors form their perceptions during group tasks. Identity control theory may 
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help us identify a specific process that answers this ‘how’ question (Burke 
1997). 
According to identity control theory (ICT), the ratio of two variables 
predicts how actors will behave in various social contexts (Stets and Burke 
2014). The first variable is an identity standard, defined as sets of meanings 
that actors organize into coherent schemes within their minds (Stryker and 
Burke 2000). The second variable is the ways in which actors perceive their 
surroundings. ICT proposes that actors behave in ways that reduces 
discrepancies between their perceptions and the identity standards they have 
chosen to reference in a given setting.  
The concept of an identity standard is a point where social exchange 
theory intersects with identity control theory. Social exchange theory assumes 
that actors enter group tasks with the goal of resource accumulation (Molm 
2006).  If resource accumulation is a goal for actors, then it follows that actors 1
find meaning in having more rather than less of some resource. That goal may 
operate as a “person identity”  in the language of identity control theory. 2
Thus, it follows that actors would view themselves as people who want to gain 
resources during social exchange. 
 The social exchange perspective broadly defines resources as tangible (e.g. money) and 1
intangible (e.g. status) rewards (Cook and Emerson 1978).
 I use the term “person identity” and “personal identity” interchangeably throughout this 2
dissertation.
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If the goal of resource accumulation is a type of person-level identity 
standard for actors, then it follows that varying the perceptual inputs of their 
environment would affect the behaviors of actors. I propose that the context 
in which actors view themselves, their partners, and the goals of their groups 
is capable of changing these perceptual inputs. It follows from identity control 
theory that actors will compare these inputs with a salient identity standard, 
defined by their goal of resource accumulation. The predicted result is that 
social context will affect how actors reach their goal of accumulating resources 
in groups, namely the degree to which they chose to rely on generosity or 
punishment when they promote collective action during group tasks.  
In the following pages, I propose a theory of context in social exchange 
that incorporates elements of identity control theory with social exchange 
theory. I then test my proposed theory using three experiments where actors 
complete a group project with two partners. Study 1 manipulates the context 
in which groups of actors perceive themselves by giving them personality 
reports stating they have cooperative or competitive personality types. Study 
2 manipulates the relational context in groups by referring to the partners of 
actors as collaborators or competitors. Study 3 manipulates the group context 
by telling actors that cooperation or competition defines the goals of their 
groups. 
In general, results show that actors view the function of resources in 
significantly different ways depending on the context in which they view 
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themselves and others during group tasks. Cooperative contexts lead actors to 
contribute more resources to group projects than competitive contexts; in 
contrast, competitive contexts lead actors to punish their partners more than 
cooperative contexts. Mediation analyses show the effects of social context 
operate through the exchange process to generate social solidarity in groups. 
This first chapter reviewed the general logic behind my proposed 
theory. Chapter 2 discusses research from social exchange theory. Chapter 3 
continues by reviewing studies from identity control theory. In Chapter 4, I 
incorporate elements of identity control theory with social exchange theory to 
propose a theory of context in social exchange. Chapter 5 discusses the 
experiments that I designed to test predictions based on propositions from my 
proposed theory. Chapters 6 through 8 present results from experiments that 
manipulate the context in which actors view themselves, their partners, and 
the goals of their groups, respectively. Chapter 9 is a general discussion of my 
findings. Finally, Chapter 10 discusses the implications of my proposed theory 
for research on social exchange and identity control theories. 
My findings make several contributions to social exchange theory and 
identity control theory. Three of the most important of these contributions are 
worth noting. First, the results show that an underlying identity process 
affects collective action, independent of social structure. Second, the findings 
advance identity control theory by showing that social context affects how 
actors view the function of resources in social exchange settings. Cooperative 
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contexts lead actors to rely more on contributions to the group than 
competitive contexts, while competitive contexts lead actors to rely more on 
punishment of others than cooperative contexts. Third, results show how 
context operates via the exchange process to affect social solidarity among 
group members within networks of social exchange.  
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Chapter 2: Social Exchange Theory 
Social exchange theory is a framework that includes several theories, 
each of which makes similar assumptions about social interactions (Emerson 
1974; Molm 2006). First, theories of social exchange assume that actors will 
behave in their self-interests. This assumption is what allows social exchange 
theories to define actors as self-interested individuals, or collections of self-
interested people. Second, social exchange theory broadly defines resources as 
something that one actor controls but others also want to control. The theory 
broadly defines resources to include tangible (e.g. money) or intangible 
rewards (e.g. status) that hold value for actors. Further, value is not an 
intrinsic property of resources. Instead, social exchange theory assumes that 
value exists within the relationship of two or more actors, each of whom are 
seeking to control the same resource. 
 Third, theories of social exchange assume the existence of some 
structure that delimits who has the opportunity to exchange with whom in 
groups. The structure of social exchange is what creates opportunities for 
actors to pursue their self-interest by increasing the quantity of resources they 
control vis-à-vis others. Fourth, exchange structures create opportunities for 
actors to initiate the transfer of resources with partners. When partners 
accept these initiations, then a transaction occurs where actors transfer 
resources to, and receive resources from, their partners. The sequence of 
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transactions that occur between actors and their partners over time is what 
generates a social exchange relationship. Put another way, exchange relations 
are patterns of transactions that actors and their partners construct by 
initiating on exchange opportunities. 
 Chapter two has two parts. First, the chapter reviews early theories of 
social exchange by Homans (1961), Thibaut and Kelley (1959), Blau (1964), 
and Emerson (1974; 1976). Second, it reviews recent theories on the formation 
of social solidarity in networks of social exchange. The chapter concludes by 
discussing how social context could affect actor behaviors in networks of social 
exchange. 
Early Research 
 Social exchange theory involves four central concepts: actors, resources, 
networks, and the exchange process. George Homans (1958) first proposed the 
concept of social exchange to explain human behavior in groups. Homans 
(1958; 1961) narrowly defined actors as people in pursuit of their self-interests. 
According to his early theorizing, resources could include tangible or social 
resources that actors received from transactions with partners. Much of the 
early research by Homans focused on dyadic networks of two people. Drawing 
on behavioral psychology, Homans characterized social exchanges as an 
operant process that reinforced behaviors of people: gains in resources were 
positive stimuli for actors, while losses were negative stimuli. The pattern in 
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stimuli is what leads people to give more or less during repeated interactions 
with their partners.  
 Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959) theory of social exchange share a number 
of the same assumptions with Homans’s early work. For example, Thibaut 
and Kelley also viewed actors as self-interested people. They broadly defined 
resources as tangible or intangible rewards and focused primarily on dyadic 
networks of social exchange. Thibaut and Kelley depart from Homan’s 
theorizing in how they view the social exchange process. For Homans, social 
exchange was an operant process that reinforced human behavior similar to 
other types of animals.  Thibaut and Kelley’s theory, in contrast, assigned 3
more agency to people by introducing the concept of “comparison levels.” 
According to this concept, people compare their present outcomes during 
social exchange with past experiences. Thus, the capacity to compare past and 
present results is what motivates the way that people choose to behave in 
future opportunities during social exchange.  
 Several years later, Peter Blau (1964) would draw from earlier works to 
present a revised theory of social exchange. Similar to past exchange theories, 
Blau viewed actors as people in pursuit of their self-interests. Blau also 
broadly defined resources as tangible or intangible constructs. However, Blau’s 
theorizing broadened the treatment of networks and the social exchange 
process in two ways. First, he proposed that social exchange processes 
 Homans (1958: 598) originally compared the social exchange process of humans to the 3
operant process that affects how pigeons seek out food in cages.
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between two partners could shape the interpersonal relationships of larger, 
more complex organizations. Second, Blau took a more constructionist view of 
the social exchange process. People not only responded to present outcomes 
based on their comparisons to prior experiences, they also could actively use 
social exchange to construct values and norms. According to Blau, the 
exchange process is what leads to the construction of widely shared values and 
norms between groups of people housed within larger organizations. 
 In subsequent research, Richard Emerson (1974) began to consolidate 
the various streams of social exchange theory into a formal theoretical 
framework. Drawing on Homans’ theorizing, Emerson assumed that actors 
behaved in their self-interests by seeking positive reinforcement from their 
behaviors. Resources provide this reinforcement, broadly defined by Emerson 
as tangible and intangible rewards for actors. However, Emerson was primarily 
concerned with the ways in which relationships defined the value of resources 
for actors. Two related theories are the basis for locating the value of 
resources within the relationships of actors. 
 The first theory was Thibaut and Kelley’s concept of comparison 
processes, which emphasized relative comparisons with others during the 
exchange process. The second was Emerson’s (1962: 32, Footnote 7) own 
theory of power-dependency relations, which draws from the concept of 
comparison levels that Thibaut and Kelley identified. According to power-
dependency theory, power is the capacity to induce others to do something 
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whether they want to or not. People have power when others depend on them 
for valued resources given the constraints from a social structure. Thus, power 
is a function of one’s desire for resources they otherwise could not obtain by 
themselves. If the structure of relationships delimits who controls what 
resource, then it follows the value of this resource is also located within the 
relationships of actors.  
 Power-dependency theory focused on power relationships where 
incumbents of structural positions had more rather than fewer exchange 
opportunities in networks. Emerson’s theory of social exchange introduced the 
concept of interdependency in networks without power differences between 
partners. He proposed that equal-power networks could also foster varying 
levels of interdependency, generating outcomes that include trust, 
commitment, and cohesion. These outcomes are the focus of my study. I now 
will discuss the role that interdependency has in shaping these outcomes as 
discussed in Molm et al.’s (2007) theory. 
Reciprocity Theory of Social Exchange 
 Molm and colleagues (2007) present a theory on reciprocity that 
explains how trust and commitment forms within different network structures. 
The theory identifies two structural characteristics that affect group 
perceptions, which, in turn, affects trust and commitment between group 
members.  
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The first characteristic is the flow of resources. In networks, resources 
flow unilaterally when actors give rewards to one partner but receive them 
from another person located in distal parts of the network. Resources flow 
bilaterally when actors give resources to the same partner who gives them 
resources in return. For example, networks of generalized exchange have a 
unilateral flow of resources because Actor A sends resources to Partner B, who 
sends resources to Partner C who, in turn, returns resources to Actor A. 
Networks of negotiated exchange have a bilateral flow of resources because 
Actor A can send and receive resources with Partner B and Partner C. 
Further, both of these partners may exchange with each other in similar ways. 
 The second characteristic of networks is the structure of reciprocity. 
This structure may have direct or indirect forms of reciprocity between 
partners. Direct reciprocity involves actors who transfer resources after they 
agree on the terms of exchange. Indirect reciprocity involves actors sending 
resources to partners before knowing the quantity of resources they will 
receive from others. For example, networks of negotiated exchange have direct 
forms of reciprocity since the negotiation of resources between Actor A and 
Partners B or C occurs before they transfer resources between each other. 
Networks of generalized exchange have an indirect form of reciprocity because 
Actor A sends resources to Partner B without knowing how much Partner C 
will send back to Actor A. 
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 According to Molm and colleagues’ theory, the flow of resources 
(bilateral versus unilateral) and the structure of reciprocity (direct versus 
indirect) affect social solidarity via three distinct mechanisms. The first is risk 
of non-reciprocity that actors confront when they transfer resources to their 
partners. Bilateral flows of resources and direct reciprocity significantly 
reduces these risks when compared to unilateral flows and indirect forms of 
reciprocity.  The risk of non-reciprocity as a causal mechanism in Molm and 
colleagues’ (2007) theory draws from earlier research on power-dependency 
(Cook and Emerson 1978) and network exchange (Walker et al. 2000) 
theories.  
As discussed earlier, the original exchange theorists largely focused on 
psychological mechanisms in dyadic exchange relationships (Homans 1958). 
During the 1970s, sociological research began to expand this focus to include 
networks with more than two actors in them. Drawing from research on 
prospect theory in psychology by Tversky and Khaneman (1974), Cook and 
Emerson (1978) identified the effects of risk in promoting commitment 
between actors within exchange relationships. Similarly, Kollock (1994) 
proposed that commitment with others represents a strategy that actors 
employ to protect themselves from risky exchange relationships. Based on 
qualitative research in Southeast Asia, Kollock (1994) noted that different 
patterns exist in economic exchange relationships for buyers of rubber and 
rice. Unlike rice, rubber is a commodity that is difficult to determine before 
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the manufacturing process. Thus, buyers of rubber cannot assess the quality 
of the commodity before they purchase it. That makes the transaction risky 
for buyers.  
Kollock (1994) explains that buyers of rubber would maintain long-
term relationships with sellers to reduce their exposure to risks, regardless of 
changes in the market price of this commodity. Unlike rubber, the long-term 
relationships between buyers and sellers of rice varied by the market price 
because it was less riskier to buy. Kollock (1994) conducted a series of 
experiments showing that uncertain exchange relationships could produce 
commitment between partners. Put simply, risk of non-reciprocity is a key 
mechanism in Molm et al.’s (2007) theory and derives from earlier research on 
structure (Cook and Emerson 1978), power (Cook et al. 1983), and  
uncertainty reduction in relationships (Kollock 1994). 
 The second mechanism in Molm and colleagues’ theory of reciprocity is 
expressive value. Molm et al. (2007: 212) defined expressive value as “the 
symbolic or communicative value that is attached to the act of reciprocity.” 
Expressive value is located within relationships of actors in network forms. 
When compared to unilateral flows of resources and indirect reciprocity, the 
bilateral flows of resources and direct forms of reciprocity increase the 
opportunities for actors to associate expressive value with social exchange.  
The third mechanism of Molm et al.’s (2007) theory is salience of conflict 
where actors view the behaviors of their partners as negative rather than 
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positive. Molm et al. (2007) argue that networks with indirect reciprocity and 
unilateral flows of resources have less conflict than structures with direct 
reciprocity and bilateral flows of resources. Consequently, networks with (1) 
more rather than less risk of non-reciprocity, (2) more rather than less 
symbolic value, and (3) less rather than more conflict between partners 
generate trust and commitment between groups of actors. 
Affect Theory of Social Exchange 
 Lawler’s (2001) affect theory of social exchange focuses on the 
emotional attribution process that actors use to understand their positive 
feelings after successful exchange outcomes. In an effort to reproduce these 
feelings, actors will try to identify the source of their emotions (e.g. partner or 
group). Network structures where actors can easily identify the source of these 
positive feelings will generate higher levels of commitment to the group 
(Lawler et al. 2008).  
 Research on social exchange typically equates value with exchangeable 
resources (Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2000; Lawler 2001; Lawler et al. 2008). 
From this, research assumes that actors want to increase the quantity of 
resources they have in networks of social exchange. The standard exchange 
theoretic explanation of value draws from Kollock’s (1994) uncertainty-
reduction process where actors try to minimize the chance they will lose 
resources from social exchange. Lawler and Yoon (1996: 90) note how this 
"  15
standard explanation derives from Emerson’s early work on the effects of 
networks on patterns in the frequency of exchanges. The authors revisit this 
concept of value in their theory of relational cohesion and propose that 
partners also value positive emotional responses during social exchange. 
 Lawler and Yoon (1996) observed that commitment increased as 
partners successfully completed more rather than fewer exchanges with each 
other. This finding alone supports the uncertainty-reduction hypothesis. 
Partners who exchange with each other may develop a norm of behavior that 
reduces uncertainty in the relationship. However, these partners also 
completed a series of questionnaires asking them about their feelings (e.g. 
pleasure and satisfaction; interest and excitement) and their perceptions of 
relational cohesion (e.g. close or distance, cooperative or conflicting) (Lawler 
and Yoon 1996: 99). Lawler and Yoon found that actors reporting positive 
emotions also reported higher rather than lower levels of commitment and 
cohesion in their groups. Thus, Lawler and Yoon’s (1996) theory of relational 
cohesion argues that positive affect is a distinct causal mechanism in 
promoting social solidarity in groups.  
 Lawler’s (2001) affect theory of social exchange proposed that a similar 
affective mechanism exists in network structures of three or more actors. 
Incorporating concepts from Collins’s (1981) theory of interaction ritual 
chains, Lawler’s (2001) affect theory proposed that actors prefer to maximize 
their material and emotional value during social exchange. According to the 
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theory, actors’ experience an emotional “buzz” when an exchange task is 
successful and they want to recreate this feeling in future tasks (Lawler 2001). 
Consequently, emotional responses from past exchanges influences the 
behavior of actors in the future. Lawler’s (2001) affect theory of social 
exchange focuses on the emotional attribution process that actors use to 
understand their positive feelings after a successful exchange outcome. In an 
effort to reproduce these feelings, actors will try to identify the source of their 
emotions (e.g. partner or group). Network structures where actors can easily 
identify the source of these positive feelings will generate greater levels of 
commitment to the group (Lawler et al. 2008).  
 The key structural characteristic for Lawler’s (2001) affect theory is 
jointness, which is similar to the two structural characteristics that Molm et 
al.’s (2007) theory of reciprocity identifies (flow of resources, form of 
reciprocity). Joint networks, according to Lawler (2001), have a direct form of 
reciprocity and a bilateral flow of resources because they allow for actors to 
directly negotiate with each other in networks . The affect theory of social 
exchange predicts that highly joint networks (e.g. bilateral flow of resources 
and direct reciprocity in the language of Molm et al.’s theory) will lead to 
more positive affective regard than structures with less joint-ness (e.g. 
unilateral flow of resources and indirect reciprocity, according to Molm et 
al.).  
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Integrated Model of Social Exchange 
 Kuwabara (2011) presents an integrated model of social exchange that 
incorporates elements from theories by Lawler (2001) and Molm et al. (2007). 
While Lawler and Molm et al. focus on what features of networks affect social 
solidarity, Kuwabara’s model explains when network features affect solidarity 
by focusing on the affective and relational contexts of groups. This model 
defines affective contexts by the degree to which actors view their partners as 
cooperative or competitive. In comparison, the relational context affects 
whether actors view their relationships with partners as interdependent or 
independent.  
 Kuwabara’s integrated model predicts that affective context will 
generate trust, affective regard, and cohesion by shaping how much actors 
view their partners as collaborators or competitors. The relational context is 
what generates a sense of shared responsibility by promoting joint actions, 
further reinforcing group cohesion. Kuwabara presents results in support of 
the integrated model by manipulating specific features of dyadic networks. For 
example, relational context is joint in dyads where the flow of resources is 
bilateral rather than unilateral. Further, the affective context is more 
cooperative in dyads with distributive rather than integrative forms of 
negotiation. 
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 The integrated model is relevant here for three reasons. First, results in 
support of this model show that cohesion is a distinct concept from trust and 
commitment. Second, the relational and affective contexts of groups affect 
trust, commitment, and cohesion in different ways. Third, and perhaps most 
important for our purposes, the perceptions of cooperation within 
relationships has a distinct effect on levels of cohesion, independent of 
structural jointness. If Kuwabara’s (2011) model is correct in making the 
claim that perceptions of cooperation affect elements of social solidarity, 
independent of network structures, then one may ask how perceptions of social 
context affects the attitudes and behaviors of actors?  I explore that question 
in more detail below. 
Social Exchange Heuristic 
 Experimental research from economics finds that some actors may 
experience confusion during group tasks. For example, calling a prisoner 
dilemma game a “Community Game” instead of a “Stock Market Game” leads 
people to behave more generously in particular types of contexts (Ellingsen, 
Johannesson, Mollerstrom, and Munkhammar 2012). Adrioni (1995) found 
that actors behaved more generously in public goods games when they had 
less rather than more information about their relative standing in groups. 
These results have led some to propose that actors behave generously toward 
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others because they are merely confused about the best strategy to employ in 
groups.  
 Others have proposed that actors have a cognitive bias during social 
exchange (Kiyonari, Tanida, and Yamagishi 2000; Yamagishi, Terai, Kioynari, 
Milfune, Kanazawa 2007; Simpson 2004). The “social exchange heuristic” 
describes how features of social context lead actors to view a prisoner’s 
dilemma games as if it was an assurance game - the latter has different 
optimal strategies for actors to earn resources than the former. In prisoner 
dilemma games, the optimal strategy for actors is defection from the group; 
while cooperation is the optimal strategy in assurance games. Yamagishi and 
colleagues (2007) found that actors behaved more generously in prisoner 
dilemma games when they had to think about the motives of partners before 
interacting with them rather than not thinking about these motives.   
 In a follow-up study, Yamagishi (2007) reports that actors behaved 
more generously in public goods games where experimenters told them they 
had been matched with a specific partner compared to those who were not 
told about this matching. Simpson (2004) found similar evidence of a social 
exchange heuristic using vignettes that simulated a prisoner’s dilemma game. 
The actors in this study made decisions for three types of prisoner’s dilemma 
games and then completed the triple dominance measure of social value 
orientation. Based on their responses, Simpson classified actors as 
individualistic or pro-social and found those in the latter group were more 
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likely to subjectively “transform” prisoner’s dilemma games into assurance 
games. Thus, the social exchange heuristic may disproportionately affect those 
with more pro-social rather than individualistic value orientations. 
Conclusion 
To summarize, social exchange theory assumes that actors want to 
accumulate resources in groups. Networks of social exchange delimit who may 
exchange what with whom over time. In recent years, social exchange theorists 
have identified what specific features within these networks affect the 
attitudes and behaviors of actors in groups. Molm et al. (2007) propose that 
perceptions of uncertainty in networks affect the behavior of actors, leading to 
social solidarity in groups. Lawler’s (2001) affect theory focuses on the degree 
that networks lead actors to associate their positive feelings with self or 
others. These network features shape the behaviors of actors, evoking positive 
feelings within them, and generating solidarity in groups. Thus, it is the 
network structure shaping the degree that actors attribute their positive 
feelings with others, leading to group solidarity.  
Kuwabara (2011) draws from theories by Molm et al. (2007) and 
Lawler (2001) and tests the effects of relational and affective contexts on 
group solidarity. An important contribution from Kuwabara’s model is that 
perceptions of cooperation by actors shape solidarity, independent of joint-
ness in networks. I advance these findings by asking a simple question: how do 
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networks lead actors to perceive higher or lower levels of social solidarity in 
groups?  
We know that people have a tendency to make errors when they 
perceive their relationships with others (Kiyonari, Tanida, and Yamagishi 
2000; Yamagishi, Terai, Kioynari, Milfune, Kanazawa 2007; Simpson 2004). I 
propose these errors may not be a function of a cognitive bias, but part of a 
larger social process characterized by actors trying to align their perceptions 
with an identity standard during group tasks. These actors prefer that their 
perceptions remain stable, instead of unpredictable, during social exchange. 
To these ends, it follows that actors will organize their perceptions during the 
group task and their behaviors will reflect how they perceive these 
interactions. 
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Chapter 3: Identity Control Theory 
The social world is a complex place that has a near infinite number of 
components, only some of which are observable to actors (Cooley 1902; Mead 
1934). An identity is a cognitive scheme that actors use to organize the 
meanings they attach to the observable components of social life (Markus 
1977; Stryker and Serpe 1994; Stets 2006). Identity control theory (hereafter 
ICT) explains how these schemes affect the ways that actors chose to behave 
in various social contexts (Burke and Stets 2009).  
According to ICT, social context activates the salience of relevant 
identities within the minds of actors (Stryker and Serpe 1994). Such identities 
become points of reference for actors when they decide how to behave in 
various social contexts. ICT assumes that actors want their environments to 
match the identity standards they have chosen to reference. Identity 
verification occurs when the identity standards that actors reference match 
their environment. When discrepancies exist between the environment and 
these identity standards, ICT predicts that actors will behave in ways to 
reduce this difference. Thus, ICT posits that actors behave the way they do 
because they want their identity and surroundings to match each other. 
To illustrate, let us say a young woman finds meaning in her identity as 
a “smart” undergraduate student.  That identity serves as a standard for her 
to reference in her college courses. When she receives high grades from her 
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professors, it verifies her identity. When professors give her low grades, she 
observes signals from her environment that contradict her “smart” identity. 
ICT predicts this woman will behave in ways to increase signals that verify 
her identity, and avoid signals that contradict her identity. Thus, she may 
decide to spend more time studying for her exams, take extra time in writing 
her papers, or enroll in classes where it is likely that she will receive high 
grades.  
ICT starts with the assumption that some identity standard is salient 
to actors in a given time and place. The theory broadly defines the concept of 
“identity” to include any set of meanings that actors may organize into 
coherent frameworks within their minds. Thus, identity standards may relate 
to social (e.g. race), role-based (e.g. occupation), or person-level (e.g. moral 
values) self-meanings (Freese and Burke 1994). 
There is evidence that actors will behave in ways that align with their 
personal identity standards. Stets and Carter (2011) had participants 
complete a survey where they rated their own moral identity (e.g. honest/
dishonest, untruthful/truthful, selfish/selfless). Several weeks later, these same 
participants volunteered for a laboratory experiment where they completed a 
standardized test on a computer. The performance by participants on this test 
determined how many raffle tickets they would receive for a chance to win 
$100. The better participants did on this test, the more likely it was for them 
to win cash rewards.  
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 Before participants began the computerized test, experimenters 
pretended to check the computer in front of participants. This checking 
allowed experimenters to show participants that tapping the escape key would 
allow them to change an answer if it was incorrect. Next, experimenters told 
participants that they should not use the key while taking the standardized 
test. Unbeknown to participants, their computer automatically tracked how 
many times they hit the escape key and changed their test answers. The 
results show that participants were significantly less likely to behave 
immorally (by using the escape key) in the experiment when they had a 
stronger, rather than weaker, moral identity (Stets and Carter 2011). In 
support of identity control theory, the finding shows that individuals will 
behave in ways that align with their personal identity standards (e.g. moral 
identity). 
Burke’s Identity Model of Network Exchange 
 Burke’s (1997) identity model of network exchange incorporates 
elements of identity control theory with network exchange theory. Network 
exchange theory (NET), a close relative of social exchange theory, explains 
how network structures generate power differences in groups. The theory 
defines power as the structural capacity to obtain valued outcomes even when 
others resist (Markovsky et al. 1993). According to NET, the distribution of 
these resources is dependent on the positions that incumbents occupy within 
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networks. Decades of research on NET find that varying the connections 
between positions in networks affects who exchanges with whom in groups 
(Lovaglia, Skvoretz, Willer, and Markovsky 1995; Markovsky et al. 1993; 
Skvoretz and Willer 1993; Walker et al. 2000). The result is that some actors 
gain more resources than others, leading to power differences in groups. 
 NET assumes the goal of actors is to maximize the quantity of 
resources they control in groups (Markovsky et al. 1993). It is from this 
assumption that NET examines how network structures constrain the capacity 
of actors to achieve this goal of resource accumulation. Burke’s (1997) identity 
model broadens the assumption that actors want to maximize their own 
resources by focusing on varying the goals of individuals. According to the 
model, the goals of actors are located within the identities that actors seek to 
verify by exchanging resources with others in groups. Thus, resources provide 
actors the means to verify their identities that define what goals they are 
pursuing in exchange networks.  
 To test the model, Burke (1997) ran a series of simulations used by 
researchers of NET. The simulations involve computer algorithms that 
represent decisions about the allocation of resources by actors in various 
network structures. NET simulations typically assume that actors want to 
maximize their control over resources and the algorithms subsequently 
represents these goals. Burke ran the same NET simulations after making two 
changes. First, he set the primary goal of actors at 100-percent participation 
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in exchanges with partners. Second, Burke set a secondary goal of actors as 
the avoidance of getting few or no resources during the exchange. Next, Burke 
ran the simulations in the same network structures that lead to power 
difference in groups and compared his results to previous NET experimental 
and simulation results that assumed the goals of actors were defined by 
resource maximization. Burke’s changes to the goals of simulated actors led to 
a more equitable distribution of resources in groups compared to NET 
simulations, reducing power differences in network structures. 
 The social context may affect how identity processes operate within 
networks known by social exchange theorists to generate social solidarity in 
groups. It could be that the social context affects how actors perceive their 
environment and, therefore, the means used to verify their identity standards.  
To illustrate, let us return to my previous example of the woman who views 
herself as a “smart” undergraduate student. What happens when she becomes 
a graduate student, where grades have less importance than in undergraduate 
classes? The same woman may value high grades, but she may choose to focus 
more of her attention on conducting research than, say, preparing for midterm 
exams in her graduate courses.  Why would this fictitious woman change her 
strategy of identity verification as an undergraduate when she becomes a 
graduate student? 
 I propose that the social context (undergraduate or graduate classes) 
affects how people view the function of resources (course grades or research). 
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The same fictitious student may still want to verify her identity as being 
“smart,” but elect to follow different strategies depending on the features of 
her immediate context. That is why she focuses less of her attention on course 
grades as a graduate rather than as an undergraduate student when verifying 
the same identity of “being smart.” In the next section, I review some research 
on the effects that social context has on group dynamics. 
Social Context 
There is evidence that social context affects the attitudes and behaviors 
of people (Berkowitz and LePage 1967; Carter 2013; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and 
Magee 2003; Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, and Gruenfeld 2006; Hill, Bartol, Tesluk, 
and Langa 2009; Stets and Burke 2014; Stets and Carter 2011). For example, 
studies find that people in a room with a firearm will behave more 
aggressively towards others than when no gun is present (Berkowitz and 
LePage 1967). Priming experiments show that people who write about times 
they had power over someone else were more self-oriented and willing to act 
by themselves than people that wrote about experiences of powerlessness 
(Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee 2006).  
Chatman and Barsade (1995) found evidence of a social context effect 
in a study where they defined the goals of collective tasks as cooperative or 
competitive. The study had two groups of participants complete a business 
simulation as incumbents of roles within a fictitious company. For one group, 
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experimenters gave participants literature that described the company as 
having a reputation for teamwork and a collectivist culture. The second group 
received literature that described the company as having a reputation for 
individualism and a culture that was competitive.  
Researchers asked participants to rate the cooperativeness of their 
partners and to self-report the number of people they interacted with during 
the simulation (Chatman and Barsade 1995). Participants in the cooperative 
group rated their partners as more cooperative than people in the competitive 
group. Those in the cooperative group also reported that they interacted with 
more people during the simulation than participants in the group with a 
competitive culture. The results suggest that context affects how actors 
perceive their relationships with others during group tasks.  
Evidence from research on social exchange theory also finds effects from 
social context. In one study, Molm, Whitman, and Melamed (2012) found that 
prior histories in one form of exchange affects elements of social solidarity that 
forms latter in different network forms. The authors assigned groups of actors 
to networks of negotiated exchange before completing reciprocal exchange or 
vice-versa. Results show that experiences in negotiated exchange sensitized 
actors to perceived conflict in reciprocal exchange. And, the experiences in 
reciprocal networks “inoculated” actors from the negative effects of negotiated 
exchange on elements of solidarity (Molm et al 2012).  The result is that 
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history of exchange in other network forms affects the formation of trust, 
affective regard, and relational solidarity in the other.  
If the features of social context affect how actors perceive self and 
others in groups, then changing features of this context may affect how actors 
view the function of resources they give to and receive from others during 
group tasks. Specifically, social context may lead actors to view resources as a 
means of contributing to a group project or punishing others. The degree to 
which actors view the function of resources as contributions or punishment 
could subsequently affect social solidarity in groups.  
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Propositions and Predictions 
Scope Conditions 
 The proposed theory of context in social exchange explains how social 
context affects the behaviors of actors, leading to the formation of solidarity 
in groups. My proposed theory has four scope conditions. First, the theory 
focuses on groups of two or more actors working together on a collective task. 
Second, actors exchange some non-excludable resource during this task, 
meaning the resources gained by one partner does not reduce the gains by 
others in the same group. Third, actors know how much each of their partners 
contributed to the group during this collective task. Fourth, actors have the 
opportunity to spend their own resources to anonymously punish others in the 
group. Given these scope conditions, the proposed theory explains how social 
context affects the means by which actors promote collective action in groups, 
leading to the formation of social solidarity between group members. 
Propositions 
Social exchange theory assumes that actors enter social interactions 
with the goal of maximizing some valued resource. If actors value a resource, 
then it follows that actors find meaning in the goal of maximizing how much 
of the resource they control.  If the goal of acquiring resources is: (a) 
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meaningful to actors, and (b) salient to actors within groups, then the goal of 
resource accumulation operates as an identity standard. Specifically, this goal 
operates as a personal identity standard whereby actors view themselves as 
individuals that want to control more rather than less resources (Burke 1997). 
Identity control theory argues that actors want to control how they 
perceive their surroundings and do so by referencing identity standards 
(Carter 2013; Stets and Burke 2014; Stets and Carter 2011). If the goal of 
resource accumulation represents a person-level identity standard for actors, 
then it follows that changing the context of group tasks would affect how 
actors perceive the means by which they verify this identity (Carter 2013). 
Identity control theory predicts that changing these perceptions of actors 
would affect their behaviors as they attempt to verify salient identity 
standards. 
I assume the more that a social context attends to the group-interests, 
the more likely it is for actors to focus their attention toward the group- 
rather than their own self-interests. When actors focus their attention toward 
the group rather than self-interests, the (a) more likely those actors will 
behave as if they view the function of resources as contributions, and (b) the 
less likely those actors will behave as if they view the function of resources as 
punishment toward others in the group. 
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Proposition 1 (Resource Allocation). The more that social context  
emphasizes the interests of groups rather than self-interests of actors, 
 (a) the more that actors will behave as if they view the function of  
 resources as contributions to the group, and (b) the less that actors will 
 behave as if they view the function of resources as punishment against 
 individual group members. 
The affect theory of social exchange (hereafter called the affect theory) 
explains how the emotions of actors generate social solidarity in groups 
(Lawler 2001).  According to the affect theory, outcomes from social exchange 
evoke positive or negative feelings within actors. The theory assumes that 
actors want to know why they experience these feelings and do so by 
attributing their emotions to self, others, or the group as a whole. 
The structure of networks affects where actors decide to attribute their 
positive feelings. When features of networks clearly delimit who gave what to 
whom, the theory predicts that actors will attribute their positive feelings to 
others. When actors attribute positive feelings with others instead of self, the 
affect theory predicts that more rather than less social solidarity forms in 
groups. Similarly, identity control theory predicts that actors will experience 
positive feelings when there is less discrepancy between their perceptual 
inputs and the identity standard they have chosen to reference (Stets and 
Burke 2014). If the goal of actors is to accumulate valued resources, and we 
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treat this goal as a “person-level” identity standard, then it follows that actors 
will verify this standard when they gain more rather than less resources from 
the group. The result, according to identity control theory and the affect 
theory of social exchange, is that actors will experience positive feelings. 
Proposition 2 (Affect). When actors gain more resources from the 
group, the more positive rather than negative feelings they will 
experience. 
 The scope of my proposed theory includes groups of three or more 
actors working together in public goods games. The structure of public goods 
game clearly delimits who contributed how many resources to a shared pool. 
According to the affect theory of social exchange and identity control theory, 
the structure of public goods games should lead actors to attribute their 
positive feelings with others. It follows from the theory that actors who 
experience positive feelings in the same networks would also report higher 
levels of trust and commitment in their groups. 
Proposition 3 (Interpersonal Dynamics). Positive affect will lead 




 Social exchange theory views the relationship between actors and their 
partners as interdependent. In other words, the behaviors of actors toward 
their partners at one point in time affects how they will chose to behave in the 
future. The social exchange framework assumes that actors have the capacity 
to identify patterns in these behaviors when they interact with their partners 
over time. Such patterns are what lead actors to formulate beliefs about trust 
and commitment based on their experiences during social exchange (Lawler et 
al. 2008; Molm et al. 2007). According to the social exchange theoretic 
perspective, cohesion is a concept defined by how actors view themselves as 
part of a group that is a distinct entity from themselves (Kuwabara 2011). 
Proposition 4 follows by proposing that trust and commitment between 
partners in groups will generate higher rather than lower levels of group 
cohesion:  
Proposition 4 (Cohesiveness). When actors contribute more resources  
to the group and fewer resources to punish their partners, the more  
they will perceive themselves and these partners as a cohesive entity. 
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Figure 4.1 The Proposed Theory of Context in Social Exchange 
Diagram of the Proposed Theory 
 Figure 4.1 diagrams the multilevel dimensions of the proposed theory 
of context in social exchange. The solid line represents the macro-level 
relationship between the independent variable (features of social context) and 
the dependent variable (group cohesion). The four arrows with dashed lines 
represent a causal path between three dependent variables at the micro-level 
that affect the formation of group cohesion at the macro-level. 
 According to the above diagram, Proposition 1 proposes that social 
context affects the ways in which actors use valued resources in groups. In 
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contribute more of their resources into a shared-resource pool.  When public 4
goods games provide actors the opportunity to punish their partners without 
them knowing who punished whom, then actors have two ways to induce their 
partners to contribute more resources. First, actors may choose to contribute 
resources to the shared pool and hope their partners will exhibit similar levels 
of generosity in the future. Second, actors may elect to induce their partners 
to behave generously by punishing them.  More likely than not, actors will 
choose a combination of both strategies during social exchange. 
 Proposition 1 states that social context affects whether actors choose a 
strategy of reliance on contributions to their groups or punishment of 
individual group members. Cooperative contexts will focus the attention of 
actors on group-interests, leading them to rely more on contributions and less 
on punishment than in competitive contexts. When most actors contribute 
more rather than fewer resources into a shared pool during public goods 
games, actors are more likely to gain resources from the group.  
Proposition 2 draws from the affect theory of social exchange and 
identity control theory by proposing that actors will experience positive 
feelings when they receive resources from the group. Proposition 3 follows 
from the affect theory to propose that trust and commitment is higher in 
groups that evoke more positive rather than negative feelings within actors. 
 From the point of view of actors, the optimal strategy in public goods games is extreme 4
“free-riding” where one actor contributes zero resources but her or his partners both 
contribute all of their resources. Extreme free riding becomes less optimal during social 
exchange because it leads partners to reduce their generosity over time.
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Proposition 4 states that trust and commitment will lead actors to view their 
group as a cohesive social entity.  
Predictions 
 I test my predictions using three separate experiments. During each 
experiment, actors completed a repeated publics good game with the same 
two partners. The game has 24 periods, with two stages within each period. In 
the first stage, all members of the group receive 20 tokens and they can decide 
to contribute none, some, or all of these tokens into a group project. The 
partners of actors simultaneously make this same decision. After everyone 
makes a decision, the game sums all contributions and multiples this total by 
a factor of 0.50 to determine the product. This product is how much the game 
returns to each group member. In the second stage, the game shows how 
much each person in the group gave to, and received from, the group during 
the previous stage. It is during this second stage that actors can spend one of 
their own tokens to anonymously send two punishment points to their 
partners. These actors can spend no more than 10 tokens - sending a 
maximum of 20 punishment points - to each of their two partners. The game 
tells actors how many punishment points both of their partners sent to them. 
It also shows actors the total amount they earned in the game. After showing 
actors this information, the game begins a new period of this group task.  
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 Proposition 1 of the proposed theory of context in social exchange 
proposes that social context affects the behavior of actors in public goods 
games. This proposition assumes that social context will affect how actors 
view the function of resources, leading them to use these resources in different 
ways. Hypothesis 1 predicts that actors will rely more on contributions to the 
group project when they are located in networks with cooperative rather than 
competitive contexts.  Hypothesis 2 predicts that actors will spend fewer 
resources to punish their partners in networks with cooperative rather than 
competitive contexts.  5
Hypothesis 1: Networks with cooperative contexts will cause actors to 
contribute more resources to a group project than networks with 
competitive contexts.  
  
Hypothesis 2: Networks with cooperative contexts will cause actors to 
spend fewer resources to punish their partners than networks with 
competitive contexts.  
 In my original proposal, Hypothesis 2 predicted that cooperative contexts would lead actors 5
to punish their partners more when these partners behaved selfishly. That prediction was 
logically inconsistent with Proposition 1 of my proposed theory. Specifically, Proposition 1 
states that social context will lead actors to behave as if they view the function of resources 
as contributions to the group rather than sanctions against individuals. I revised Hypothesis 2 
based on my reading of Burke’s (1997) identity model of network exchange.
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 If actors contribute more resources to the group project, and spend 
fewer resources punishing their partners, then actors are likely to gain 
resources from the group project. According to the affect theory of social 
exchange, such gains would evoke positive feelings within actors. Hypothesis 3 
tests Proposition 2 by measuring the emotions that actors express in their 
faces in the last four minutes of the group task.  I make the following 6
prediction: 
Hypothesis 3: Networks with cooperative contexts will cause more 
positive facial expressions by actors than networks with competitive 
contexts. 
  
 I also measured the emotions of actors by asking them questions about 
their general feelings during the group project. In each experiment, actors 
gave answers to questions that asked them to rate how positive or negative 
they felt toward each of their partners and the group as a whole. Proposition 
2 states that actors who received resources from the group will experience 
more positive than negative feelings. Hypothesis 4 predicts that actors in 
 I did not have the computing power to analyze data for the entire video of participant’s 6
faces. I estimated that each period of the group task took participants one minute to 
complete. Since there were 24 periods in total, I chose to analyze the last sixth of tasks which 
lasts about four minutes. Relational cohesion theory predicts that actors would experience the 
most positive feelings at later points in time (Lawler and Yoon 1996).  Thus, it is likely that 
actors would express the most positive feelings during later rather than earlier parts of the 
group task.
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cooperative rather than competitive contexts will report more positive feelings  
in survey questions they answer after completing the group task: 
Hypothesis 4: Networks with cooperative contexts will cause actors to 
report feelings that are more positive about the group project than 
networks with competitive contexts. 
  
 Proposition 3 states that actors who experience positive feelings in 
groups will report higher levels of trust and commitment Proposition 4 follows 
that trust and commitment will lead to higher rather than lower levels of 
group cohesion. Hypothesis 5 follows from these propositions by predicting 
that actors will report higher levels of social solidarity in networks with 
cooperative rather than competitive contexts: 
Hypothesis 5: Networks with cooperative contexts will generate 
higher levels of trust, commitment, and cohesion in groups than 
networks with competitive contexts. 
Mediation Analyses 
 My proposed theory argues that social context affects cohesion when 
actors exchange resources with their partners in groups. Thus, the exchange of 
resources is part of a causal relationship between my independent (social 
context) and dependent variables (group cohesion). Mediation analysis is a 
statistical technique for testing whether actor behaviors during social 
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exchange (contributions to the group and punishment of partners) transmits 
the effect of social context on cohesion.  
 Baron and Kenny (1986) outlines a process for conducting mediation 
analyses. The process involves estimating three linear regression equations, 
each presented below:  
 Y = a1 + B1X + e1    (1) 
 M = a2 + B2X + e2    (2) 
 Y = a3 + B3X + B4M + e3   (3) 
 where Y represents the dependent variable (i.e. group cohesion), X is 
the independent variable (i.e. social context), M is the mediator (i.e. average 
contributions to the group project or punishment of partners), a is the 
constant for each equation, B is the effect size, and e is the error term.  
 Mediation analysis involves a four-step process (Baron and Kelley 1986; 
MacKinnon, Fairchild, and Fritz, 2007). First, the researcher identifies a 
significant relationship between an independent and dependent variable. That 
relationship is displayed in Equation 1, where social context (B1X) affects 
levels of cohesion in groups (Y).  Second, there is a significant relationship 
between this independent variable on the mediator. Equation 2 shows this 
relationship between social context (B2X) and the average contributions to the 
group project or average punishment of partners in the group (M). 
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 Third, the mediator significantly affects the dependent variable after 
controlling for the effect from the independent variable. Equation 3 shows the 
effect that the mediator (B4M) has on group cohesion (Y), after controlling for 
social context (B3X). Fourth, I used the Sobel mediation test to determine 
whether the mediator in Equation 3 (M) significantly transmits the effect of 
the independent variable on the dependent variable. (For more information 
about this test, see MacKinnon et al. 2007: 5-7).  
 My proposed theory states that social context affects what actors do 
with resources in groups, leading to trust, commitment, and cohesion between 
group members. Thus, the exchange behaviors of actors is a central feature of 
my proposed theory. Social exchange is what provides actors the opportunity 
to control how they perceive their interactions with partners by contributing 
resources to the group project or punishing their partners. The outcomes of 
social exchange generate positive feelings within actors, leading to social 
solidarity in groups. If evidence supports my proposed theory, then it follows 
that the social exchange process would mediate the effects of context on group 
cohesion.  
 Hypothesis 6 predicts that social context will increase cohesion by 
operating through the contributions of actors to their group projects. 
Hypothesis 7, in comparison, predicts that social context operates through the 
punishment of partners to reduce group cohesion.  
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Hypothesis 6: Contributions to the group project by actors will 
mediate the effect of social context by increasing cohesion in groups. 
Hypothesis 7: Punishment of partners by actors will mediate the 
effect of social context by decreasing cohesion in groups. 
 The next chapter reviews details about the methods that I used in 
three separate experiments. Much of the design elements for each of my 
experiments are the same, except that I manipulated subtle features of social 
context. Study 1 manipulated the context in which actors viewed themselves. 
Study 2 varies the context in which actors viewed their partners. In Study 3, I 
manipulated the context in which actors viewed the goals of their groups.  
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Chapter 5:  Experimental Method 
  
 Three experiments test the effects of social context on social solidarity 
in groups. Study 1 tests the context in which actors view their personality by 
giving them personality reports that focus on cooperative or competitive 
traits. Study 2 manipulates the relational context of groups by describing the 
partners of actors as collaborators or competitors. Study 3 tests whether 
group context affects social solidarity by telling actors their group goals focus 
on cooperation versus competitive. Each study used the same five outcome 
measures:   
(1) The percent of resources that actors contribute to a group project,  
(2) The percent of resources that actors spend to punish their partners,  
(3) The emotional expressions that actors exhibit in their faces during 
the last four minutes of the group project,  
(4) Actors self-reported feelings about the group project, and  
(5) Actors self-reported beliefs about levels of trust, commitment, and 
cohesion within their groups.  
Experimental Procedures 
 I recruited participants that were enrolled in undergraduate classes 
from various departments at the University of Maryland. Participants 
registered for study sessions using an online registration system. Appendix A 
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displays my recruitment advertisement and images of the screens from my 
registration website. During the registration process, participants completed 
an online questionnaire asking them about their social value orientation. I 
used the online questionnaire to justify the personality reports that I gave 
participants in Study 1. I also sent reminder e-mails to participants one day 
before the start of their scheduled experimental session (See Appendix A).  
For each of my experiments, I randomly assigned participants to groups 
and conditions using a two-step process. First, I used a list randomizer to re-
order the names of participants for a given experimental session. I then 
assigned participants into groups of three based on the order of names on this 
randomized list. Second, I randomly assigned groups of participants to one of 
two conditions in each experiment. Thus, participants and their partners were 
assigned to the same social context in each of my three experiments.  
When participants arrived for a study session, experimenters escorted 
individuals to pre-assigned seats in the computer lab. Next, I began a short 
presentation on the instructions of the group project.  My presentation 7
reviewed the instructions that participants saw on their computer screens 
during the group project. The instructions stated that participants would 
complete 30 periods of a group task with two partners seated somewhere in 
their computer lab. The composition of these groups did not change during 
 I use the terms group “task” and “project” interchangeably throughout this dissertation.7
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the experiment. Unbeknown to participants, the group task would only last 24 
periods instead of 30 periods to prevent “end effects.”    8
 The group task occurred over a computer network using treatment for         
the Z-Tree software package (Reuben and Riedl 2009). Z-Tree is a freely 
available software program that allows multiple participants to exchange with 
one another using a single computer server. It took most groups between 30 to 
40 minutes to complete the group task (including reading the study 
instructions on their screens) using Z-Tree. The Z-Tree treatment had 
participants complete 24 periods of the task where they made two decisions in 
each period. In the first decision, the program gave each participant an 
endowment of 20 tokens and asked them to decide to contribute none, some, 
or all of their tokens to a group project. The treatment allowed participants to 
keep whatever tokens they did not contribute to the project. Z-Tree 
automatically summed the tokens contributed to the group by all three group 
members and multiplied that total by a factor of 0.50. The product was the 
amount of tokens that each actor received from the group project. 
 To illustrate, let us say that Mike, Sarah, and Adam are in the same         
group. The exchange period begins with each of them receiving an endowment 
20 tokens. Mike and Sarah decide to contribute all of their tokens to the 
group. Adam contributes none of his tokens, deciding instead to keep all of his 
 End effects refer to changes in participant behaviors when they know a task will end soon. 8
The effect may cause participants to behave less generously in the final periods of social 
exchange, independent of the manipulation.
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20 tokens for himself. The total amount contributed to the group project is 
40-tokens (20 tokens from Mike, 20 tokens from Sarah, and zero tokens from 
Adam). Next, Z-Tree multiplies these 40-tokens by 0.50 to equal 20 tokens. As 
a result, the group project returns 20 tokens to Mike, Sarah, and Adam. Since 
Mike and Sarah contributed all of their tokens, they each would earn 20 
tokens so far. Adam, however, would earn 40 tokens (the 20 tokens he kept for 
himself + the 20 tokens he received from the group project). 
 In the second stage, Z-Tree displays a new screen showing participants         
how much each member contributed and received from the group project. 
This second stage is where actors can spend one of their own tokens to send 
two deduction points to partners.  Z-Tree allows participants to spend up to 9
10 of their tokens to send a maximum of 20 deduction points to each of their 
partners. Returning to the previous example, Mike and Sarah would have the 
opportunity to buy “deduction points” against Adam. Mike and Sarah earned 
20 tokens in the first stage of the period. Let us say that Mike decides not to 
purchase any deduction points, but Sarah decides to spend 10 of her tokens to 
buy 20 punishment points for use against Adam, who chooses not to punish 
his partners in this group. Next, Z-Tree would display a new screen showing 
how much each participant earned in this period of the group task. 
 For Mike, Z-Tree would show that he started with 20 tokens,         
contributed all of his tokens to the group project, and received 20 tokens from 
 I use the terms “deduction points” and “punishment points” interchangeably throughout this 9
dissertation.
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the project. Since Mike did not purchase deduction points, his total earnings 
for the period would be 20 tokens. For Sarah, Z-Tree would show that she 
started with 20 tokens, contributed all of her tokens to the group project, and 
received 20 tokens from the project. She spent 10 of her tokens to send Adam 
20 deduction points, leaving her with 10 tokens for the period. Finally, Z-Tree 
would show that Adam started with 20 tokens, contributed none of his tokens 
to the group project, but received 20 tokens from the project. Adam had a 
subtotal of 40 tokens, less the 20 deduction points sent to him by Sarah. 
Thus, Adam’s total earning for the period is 20 tokens. 
 The Z-Tree treatment does not tell participants who punished whom         
during the group project. Instead, participants only view a screen showing the 
total amount of deduction points sent to them by both of their partners.  Z-10
Tree shows participants their running total of earnings after each period, but 
the software does not tell them how much their partners earned in the same 
period. Without some method of comparing their earnings to others, I assume 
these cumulative totals lack meaning for actors during the group project. 
When participants completed the group task, experimenters opened a 
questionnaire on their computer screens that asked them about their 
experiences during the group task. 
 The Z-Tree treatment allowed participants to have a deficit of total tokens during the group 10
task. To prevent participants from carrying high levels of deficits in their total earnings, I told 
them that everyone in the study session would receive a “bonus” of tokens determined by the 
software program. I also told them the game would deduct their deficits from this bonus.
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Experimental Methods and Theory Building 
 The proposed theory of context in social exchange predicts the 
relationship between features of social context, actor behaviors during social 
exchange, and their perceptions of social solidarity after social exchange. Put 
simply, my proposed theory explains a specific process that involves a number 
of narrowly defined variables. There are several reasons why the experimental 
method, instead of other methodologies, is attractive for testing my proposed 
theory. First, the method allows me to manipulate specific features of social 
context, including the ways that actors view themselves, their partners, and 
the goals of their groups. Second, a laboratory setting allows me to control for 
a number of confounding effects (e.g. whether or not participants know each 
other before working together on a group task). Third, experiments give me 
the capacity to consistently measure the attitudes and behaviors of 
participants over time in a controlled setting. The Z-tree software collects the 
behaviors of participants during the group task and I gave participants the 
same survey questions after they completed this task. 
 Experimental methods have the same purpose as other methodologies: 
it provides a means to test specific claims made by a theory (Lucas 2003). By 
theory, I refer to a set of logical statements explaining phenomena that span 
time, place, and historical context (Cohen 1989, 1993; Lucas 2003). 
Experiments are simply a means for testing specific relationships, between 
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narrowly defined concepts, in a particular moment in time. The results of 
experiments in and of itself are not what lead to generalizable claims. Such 
results provide evidence in support of predictions, derived from statements of 
theory, that by definition are generalizable because it spans time, place, and 
historical context. Thus, my results are merely sets of observations from a 
particular time and place that offer support for a more general statement of 
theory that spans these constraints. The replication of my results in future 
studies is what gives external validity to my proposed theory (Lucas, Morrell, 
Posard 2013; Zelditch 1969).  
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Chapter 6:  Study 1 - Individual Context 
Design and Participants 
Study 1 is a two-condition, between-subjects design in which I 
randomly assigned participants to groups where everyone received reports 
telling them they had competitive or cooperative personalities.  There were 91 
students from a large public-university located in the mid-Atlantic region of 
the United States (U.S.) who completed this study. I removed five participants 
from my final analyses who incorrectly reported the results from their 
personality test. My remaining sample size after removing those who failed 
the manipulation check was 86 participants (59 woman and 27 men). 
Manipulation and Procedures 
 Participants in Study 1 volunteered for the experiment using an online 
registration system. Appendix A displays images of each screen from this 
system. The study required that participants answer 10 questions about their 
social values. I used the questionnaire to justify results in the fictitious 
personality reports that I gave participants.  
 I scheduled between six and 15 participants for each study sessions. I 
randomly assigned participants in each session to groups of three people where 
they completed a group project. The study did not tell participants who in 
"  52
the computer lab was their partners. Upon their arrival, experimenters gave 
participants unique identification numbers and showed them where to sit in 
the labs. The study required that all participants sign a standard consent 
form.  
 After participants gave their consent to participate in Study 1, I 
presented on the instructions of the experiment. The details of my 
presentation are located in Appendix B. I used the same Microsoft 
PowerPoint presentation for all sessions in Study 1. The slides from my 
presentation outlined the instructions of the group project that participants 
were about to complete.  
 The instructional slides for Study 1 told participants they were about 
to complete a group project with two partners for the entire experiment. The 
instructions continued by telling participants that each period of the group 
project has two stages. In the first stage, instructions told participants they 
would decide how many tokens to contribute to a group project. In the second 
stage, instructions told participants they would see how much other 
participants in their group contributed to the same project. Participants 
would then have a chance to punish the other participants in their group.  
 As discussed in Chapter 5, participants in my studies completed the 
same group project and received similar instructions on the rules of the 
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project (See Appendix C).   I also told participants the University of 11
Maryland has contracted with a company named Looking Glass Incorporated 
(hereafter LGI). I explained that LGI specializes in psychometric testing of 
employees to identify their underlying personality traits. I then explained that 
LGI drafted reports on the personality traits of participants based on their 
answers to the social value questionnaire when they registered for my study.  
 I randomly selected groups of participants to receive one of two reports 
describing their personalities as competitive or cooperative. Appendix C 
displays both types of the personality reports that I gave participants. Each 
personality report has four pages. The first page displayed a color logo for 
LGI above the title, “Personality Report.” Page two described either a 
cooperative or competitive personality trait with fictitious quotes about the 
traits from two employees.  I used strength themes from Gallup Corporation’s 12
Clifton Strength Finder as the basis of descriptions for the cooperative or 
competitive personality traits (Buckingham and Clifton 2001). 
 The instructions that I gave participants in each of my three studies were different in two 11
ways. First, I changed the first two slides of instructions based on the type of context that I 
was manipulating. Second, study 2 manipulated the social context by referring to partners of 
participants as “collaborators” or “competitors.” Studies 1 and 3 referred to partners of 
participants as “participants.”
 I used the same names and professional titles for quotes used in reports about cooperative 12
or competitive personality traits. The reports attributed the first quote to “Jeremy B.” who 
was a “human resources manager.” The same report attributed the second quote to “Andrea 
H.” with the title of “sales manager.” The order of presentation of quotes was the same for 
both types of personality reports.
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 I based the descriptions of a competitive personality trait on what 
Buckingham and Clifton (2001: 91) calls the “competitive theme.” The theme 
focuses on positive aspects of competition.  I used quotes from people who 
described how they were invigorated from winning competitions with others. I 
based the description of a cooperative personality trait off the “inclusiveness 
theme” from the Gallup Corporation’s Clifton Strength Finder (Buckingham 
and Clifton 2001:103). The inclusiveness theme focuses on the positive aspects 
of making all people feel part of a group. I used quotes from people who 
described how they prefer behaving in ways that were inclusive of all people 
without judgments toward others.  
Figure 6.1 Fictitious Data Visualization from Personality Reports 
 Page three of the reports displayed graphics that visualized fictitious 
data on the personality traits of participants. Figure 6.1 displays the graphics 
used in the cooperative and competitive personality reports, respectively. The 
only differences between the two images in Figure 6.1 are the titles and colors 
used in the bar charts. The image on the left side of Figure 6.1 used blue bars, 
while the right-side image has red bars. 
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The fourth page of the report asked participants to take a moment to 
reflect on their personality traits. I used the reflection exercises to strengthen 
the effect of my manipulations on participants. The exercise asked 
participants to describe the role of cooperation or competition in their lives 
and to give an example of filtering their world using this theme. I then gave 
participants one minute to write a response. Upon completion of the reflection 
exercise, participants began the group task. I told participants that LGI 
loaded the results from their personality test into the computer program. 
Thus, participants saw one of the two images displayed in Figure 6.1. 
Appendix C displays images of each screen from this group task for 
participants in the cooperative or competitive conditions. 
Dependent Measures 
Contribution. – Each period of the public goods game began with 
actors receiving an endowment of 20 tokens. The contribution measure is the 
percentage of these 20 tokens that actors decided to transfer into a shared 
pool. On average, participants in Study 1 contributed 51% of their endowment 
to the shared pool across the 24 periods of the group project.  
Punishment. – After making decisions about contributing resources 
into a shared pool, actors viewed a new screen on their computers telling 
them how much they and their partners contributed to the shared pool. Next, 
actors made a second decision about anonymously punishing their partners. 
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Actors could spend one of their own tokens to send two deduction points to 
partners of their choosing. The game allowed participants to send up to 20 
deduction points (costing them 10 tokens) to each of their partners.  On 
average, participants in study 1 sent their partners 11% of the total number of 
deduction points allocated to them in each period of the game. 
Facial Recognition of Emotions - I used web cameras to record the 
facial expressions of participants as they completed the group project. I 
trimmed the last four minutes of the videos and then analyzed them using the 
CERT software. CERT uses algorithms to identify the level of emotions that 
people express in their faces (Valstar and Pantic 2012).  
The software is capable of measuring seven core emotions: joy, surprise, 
contempt, sadness, disgust, fear, and anger. The software also measures 
neutral expressions of emotions that do not fall into any of these seven 
categories. CERT assigns a number to each category that ranges from 0 to 
1.0, with the total values for all categories equaling 1.0. Thus, each category 
represents a percentage of emotions that participants expressed at a given 
point in time.  
CERT estimated values for each frame of the four-minute videos, 
excluding frames where participants obstructed the recording of their cameras. 
Most videos recorded between 7,000 and 12,000 frames per actor during the 
four minutes of recordings that I used. Next, I took the average of values 
assigned by CERT for each emotive category per participant. The average for 
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each category provides a measure of their emotional expressions during the 
last four-minutes of the group task.  
Positive Affect. – I measured positive affect using an index of three 
questions asking participants about their general feelings during the group 
project. Two of these questions asked participants, “In general, how would you 
describe your feelings towards Participant #[1/2] during the experiment?” 
using a seven-point scale [1 = “Very negative” / 7 = “Very positive”].  A third 
question asked participants, “How much do you feel that you and the other 
participants worked well together?” with answer choices ranging along a seven-
point scale [1 = “Not at all” / 7 = “Very much”]. The Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient of reliability for this positive affect index is 0.66. 
Trust. – I measured trust using an index of three questions. Two of 
these questions asked participants, “How much did you trust Participant 
#[1/2]?” using a seven-point scale [1 = Not at all / 7 = A lot]. The third 
question asked participants, “How much did you trust the other participants?” 
using another seven-point scale [1 = Not at all / 7 = Very much].  The 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability for the trust index is 0.70. 
Commitment. – I measured commitment using an index of three 
questions. Two of the questions asked participants, “How committed where 
you to Participant #[1/2]?” using a seven-point scale [1 = Not at all / 7 = A 
lot]. The third question asked participants, “How committed were you to the 
other participants?” using another seven-point scale [1 = Not at all / 7 = 
"  58
Very much]. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability for the 
commitment index is 0.79 
Cohesion. – I measured cohesion using an index of six answer choices 
to the same question asking participants, “Think about the relationship you 
and the other participants had during the group task. How would you describe 
the relationship on each of the following?” Participants used a nine-point scale 
for each of the following answer choices: Distant/Close, Conflictual/
Cooperative, Fragmenting/Integrating, Fragile/Solid, Divisive/Cohesive, and 
Self-Oriented/Team-Oriented. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability 
for the cohesion index is 0.89. 
Personal Identity Standard. – The Schwartz (2007) value scale is a 
personal value questionnaire that measures 10 universal values: achievement, 
benevolence, conformity, hedonism, power, security, self-direction, stimulation, 
tradition, and universalism. I used an adapted version of Schwartz’s 
questionnaire from the World Values Survey that asked participants, “You will 
see statements that describe some people. Please indicate for each description 
whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not 
like you, or not at all like you.” Participants used a five-point scale to answer 
questions that described each of the 10 universal values from Schwartz’s 
questionnaire. 
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Figure 6.2 Average Percent of Contributions to the Group by Personality Type 
Generosity 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts that actors will contribute more tokens to the 
group project when they receive reports that describe their personality as 
cooperative rather than competitive. The results in Figure 6.2 support this 
prediction. This figure displays the average percent of contributions to the 
group by actors during the 24 periods of the group task. The gray line 
represents actors with reports that described their personalities as 
cooperative; while the black line represent those individuals who received 
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Figure 6.2 Average Percent of Contributions to the Group by Personality Type
over time by condition assignment. Table 6.1 tests whether these differences in 
average contributions are statistical significant between conditions for the four 
parts of this group task. 
 The results in Table 6.1 support my first prediction: actors with reports 
that described their personality as cooperative gave, on average, 59% of their 
endowments to the group. In comparison, actors with reports that described 
their personality as competitive gave 44% of their endowments to the group. 
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1 to 6 57% 44% 2.36**
7 to 12 60% 41% 3.04**
13 to 18 57% 44% 2.10*
19 to 24 60% 46% 2.00*
All Periods 59% 44% 2.51**
N 42 44
Notes. –* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; One-tailed probabilities reported.
That difference was statistically significant (t = 2.51; p = .007, one-tailed).  13
 14
 In each quartile of the group task, Table 6.1 shows that actors with 
cooperative personality reports gave significantly more to their group than 
actors with reports describing their personality as competitive. In periods one 
to six, actors with cooperative reports gave an average of 57% to the group 
and those with competitive reports gave 44% of their endowment (t = 2.36; p 
= .010, one-tailed). For periods seven to 12, actors in the cooperative 
condition gave 60% of their endowment while those in the competitive 
condition gave 41% (t = 3.04; p = .002, one-tailed).  
 For periods 13 to 18, a similar difference exists: cooperative reports led 
actors to give 57% of their endowment, while competitive reports led actors to 
contribute 44% (t = 2.10; p = .02, one-tailed). For the last quartile, Figure 
6.1 shows that actors with cooperative reports gave 60% of their endowment 
to the group and those with competitive reports gave 46% of their 
 These differences could be a function of “group effects” where generosity by a few actors 13
leads their partners to behave generously too. I ran two separate Analysis of Covariance 
(ANCOVA) models that attempted to control for these effects. The first model controlled for 
contributions by actors relative to their partners. I calculated this measures by taking the 
average contributions by all member of a group. Next, I subtracted the contributions by 
actors from this group average. After controlling for relative contributions, I still found similar 
differences between experimental conditions (F = 5.97; p = .008, one-tailed). The second 
model controlled for average contributions from both partners of actors. After controlling for 
these contributions, I found evidence that actors were more generous in cooperative rather 
than competitive conditions (F = 2.34; p = .065, one-tailed).
 I found similar results after controlling for the gender of actors.14
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endowment. That difference also was statistically significant (t = 2.00; p = .
025, one-tailed). 
Figure 6.3 Average Percent of Punishment Toward Partners by Personality Type 
 
Punishment 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that actors will spend fewer resources to punish 
others after receiving reports describing their personality as cooperative rather 
than competitive. The results in Figure 6.3 support my prediction. This figure 
displays the average percentage of punishment points sent to partners by 
actors during the 24 periods of the group task. Similar to the previous figure, 
the gray line represents actors with cooperative personality reports and the 
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Figure 6.3 Average Percentage of Punishment toward Partners by Personality Type
difference in average percent of punishment points sent to partners between 
conditions in each quartile of the group task. 
 The results in Table 6.2 support my prediction: actors with reports 
that described their personality as cooperative sent 9% of their allotted 
punishment points to partners, while those with competitive reports sent 14% 
of their allotment to partners. That difference was statistically significant (t = 
2.06; p = .021, one-tailed). This finding could be a function of contributions 
to the group by partners of actors. If these partners behaved more generously 
than actors in groups, then actors may be less likely to punish their partners 
who gave more than they did. To address this issue, I ran a separate analysis 
of covariance (ANCOVA) model that controls for the average total amount of 
contributions by both partners of actors. After controlling for the total 
amount of contributions by these partners, actors still spent significantly less 
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1 to 6 8% 13% -2.36**
7 to 12 9% 14% -1.93* 
13 to 18 11% 15% -1.42+
19 to 24 8% 13% -1.83*
All Periods 9% 14% -2.06*
N 42 44
Notes. –  +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; One-tailed probabilities reported.
resources to punish their partners in cooperative rather than competitive 
contexts (F = 2.63; p = .054, one-tailed).   15 16
 For periods one to six, actors with cooperative reports sent 8% of their  
punishment points to partners and those with competitive reports sent 13% of 
their point allotment. That difference was statistically significant (t = -2.36; p 
= .010, one-tailed). For periods seven to 12, actors in the cooperative 
condition used 9% of their punishment points to the 14% used by this in the 
competitive condition. Again, the difference was statistically significant (t = 
-1.93;  p = .023, one-tailed).  
 For periods 13 to 18, the above table shows moderately significant 
differences between conditions: those in cooperative conditions used 11% of 
their punishment points to the 15% used by those in competitive conditions (t 
= -1.42; p = .08, one-tailed). In the last quartile, actors with cooperative 
reports used 8% of their punishment points and those with competitive 
reports used 13% of these points. That difference was also statistically 
significant (t = -1.83;  p = .035, one-tailed). 
 I ran two separate ANCOVA models that attempt to control for “group effects.” The first 15
model controlled for absolute contributions to the group by actors. After controlling for these 
absolute contributions and the interaction effect between these contributions and condition 
assignment, I still found significant differences between condition assignment in punishment of 
partners (F = 4.40; p = .020, one-tailed). The second of these models controlled for relative 
contributions to the group by actors and the interaction between these contributions and 
condition assignment. After controlling for these factors, I still found similar differences in 
punishment by condition assignment (F = 4.12; p = .023, one-tailed). 
 I found similar results after controlling for the gender of actors.16
"  65
Positive Affect 
 Hypothesis 3 predicts that actors with cooperative personality reports 
will express more positive emotions in their faces than actors that received 
competitive reports. Table 6.3 shows the results from the facial recognition 
software by condition assignment. The results do not support Hypothesis 3. 
Table 6.3 shows the emotional expressions of actors during the last four 
minutes of the group task. There were no significant differences in levels of 
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Table 6.3  Facial Expressions of Emotions by Personality Trait
Emotion Cooperative Trait Competitive Trait t-value
Joy 0.010 (.092) 0.014 (.016) -1.36*
Surprise 0.012 (.022) 0.015 (.015) -0.635
Contempt 0.266 (.111) 0.289 (.150) -0.748
Neutral 0.446 (.120) 0.381 (.127) 2.252***
Sadness 0.144 (.099) 0.185 (.161) -1.29
Disgust 0.037 (.074) 0.044 (.059) -0.499
Fear 0.023 (.072) 0.014 (.022) 0.749
Anger 0.059 (.066) 0.058 (.068) 0.028
Total 0.997 1.000
N 35 40
Notes. –  *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; One-tailed probabilities reported.  
Totals under 1.000 due to rounding error.  
Data for 11 participants who received reports describing their personality as 
cooperative are not displayed because it was lost due to technical problems during 
the video recording process.
surprise, contempt, sadness, disgust, fear, or anger. Table 6.3 shows, however, 
that actors expressed more neutral feelings when given cooperative instead of 
competitive personality reports (t = 2.252; p = .014, one-tailed). Also, levels 
of joy were higher in competitive rather than cooperative conditions (t = 
-1.36; p = .046, one-tailed).  
 Hypothesis 4 predicts that actors with cooperative personality reports 
will report feelings that are more positive after the group project than actors 
with competitive reports. I used an index of three questions that asked actors 
to rate their general feelings during the group project. Actors with reports 
that described their personality as cooperative reported higher levels of 
positive affect (M = 4.52; SD = 1.19) than actors receiving competitive 
reports (M = 3.77; SD = .84).  The results using a one-way analysis of  
variance shows significant differences between experimental conditions (F = 
11.57; p<.001, one-tailed).  17
 ANOVA assumes equal variances between samples. The results from Bartlett’s test for 17
equal variances shows a significant differences in the variance of my positive affect index 
between experimental conditions (Chi2 = 4.978;  p = .013, one-tailed). I found significant 
differences between conditions using the non-parametric, Kruskal-Wallis test (Chi2 = 7.20; p 
= .004, one-tailed).
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Figure 6.4  Means of Trust, Commitment, and Cohesion by Personality Type 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
Social Solidarity 
 Hypothesis 5 predicts that actors will report higher levels of social 
solidarity when they receive reports describing their personality as cooperative 
rather than competitive.  Figure 6.4 displays the average levels of trust, 
commitment, and cohesion by experimental condition. The results using a 
one-way analysis of variance (hereafter ANOVA) support each of the 
predictions made in Hypothesis 5. Trust was significantly higher for actors 
with cooperative rather than competitive personality reports (F = 19.28; p< .









Figure 6.4 Means of Trust, Commitment, and Cohesion by Personality Type
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
Cooperative
Competitive
levels of commitment to their group than individuals in the competitive 
condition (F = 13.14; p<.001, one-tailed). As predicted in Hypothesis 5, 
actors reported higher levels of cohesion after receiving a cooperative rather 
than competitive personality report (F = 17.33; p<.001, one-tailed).  
Figure 6.5  Mediation Analysis for Group Contribution 
Contributions and Punishment as Mediators 
Hypothesis 6 predicts that contributions to the group project by actors 
will mediate the relationship between social context and cohesion. Figure 6.5 
displays the results from an analysis testing the mediating effect of group 
contributions within the relationship between experimental condition and 
cohesion (Baron and Kenny 1986). First, I found a significant relationship 
between type of personality report and cohesion (β = 1.33; t = 4.16; p<.001, 












β = 2.07*** 
Before Mediation: β = 1.33*** 
After Mediation: β = 1.02*** 
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-tailed)
personality report and group contributions (β = .15; t = 2.51; p = .007, one-
tailed). Third, the mediator (group contributions) significantly affects cohesion 
after controlling for the effects of experimental condition (β = 2.07; t = 3.77; 
p<.001, one-tailed). Fourth, the results from a Sobel mediation test show that 
group contributions significantly transmits the effect of context on cohesion (z 
= 2.09; p<.018, one-tailed). Thus, the results in Figure 6.5 show that 
generosity to the group transmits the effect of social context on cohesion. 
Figure 6.6  Mediation Analysis for Punishment of Partners 
  
 Hypothesis 7 predicts that punishment of partners by actors will 
mediate the relationship between social context and group cohesion.  The 
results in Figure 6.6 support this prediction. First, I found a significant 











β = -4.42*** 
Before Mediation: β = 1.33*** 
After Mediation: β = 1.10*** 
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-tailed)
001, one-tailed). Second, these reports also had a significant effect on the 
punishment of partners (β = -.05; t = -2.06; p = .022, one-tailed). Third, the 
mediator significantly affected cohesion after controlling for the type of 
personality report (β = -4.42; t = -3.31; p<.001, one-tailed). Finally, the 
results from a Sobel mediation test shows that punishment transmits the 
effect from type of personality report on cohesion (z = 1.75; p<.040, one-
tailed). Thus, the results in Figure 6.6 show that punishment of partners 
transmits the  effect of social context on cohesion. 
"  71







Conformity 3.43 (1.06) 3.18 (.79) 1.05
Security 3.64 (1.01) 3.52 (1.05) 0.54
Self-Direction 3.64 (.76) 3.93 (.12) -1.73*
Stimulation 3.71 (1.04) 3.70 (.88) 0.05
Egoism vs. Altruism
Universalism 3.31 (.98) 3.34 (.96) -0.15
Benevolence 4.48 (.71) 4.18 (.81) 1.79*
Achievement 3.76 (.91) 3.80 (1.00) -0.16
Power 2.81 (.99) 3.07 (1.04) -1.18
N 42 44
Notes. – *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; One-tailed probabilities reported. 
Alternative Explanation: Changing Personal Identities 
 Identity control theory posits that behaviors of people is a function of 
the relationship between two variables: (1) the identity standard that 
individuals reference, and (2) perceptions of their immediate surroundings. My 
proposed theory assumes the first of these two variables is constant. In other 
words, I assume that participants view themselves as people who prefer to 
gain more rather than less resources (i.e. tokens) during group tasks. Under 
this assumption, I then varied how actors perceived themselves by giving 
them a report that describes their personality as cooperative or competitive.  
 However, it could be that social context affects the identity standard 
that actors have chosen to reference. By giving actors a cooperative or 
competitive personality report, they may have chosen to reference a pro-social 
or selfish identity standard. Thus, social context may operate through identity 
standards to shape behaviors that, in turn, affect solidarity in groups.  
 After completing the group task, I had actors complete a social values 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was an adapted version of Schwartz’s (2007) 
value scale found in the World Value Survey (WVS). Welzel (2009) identified 
two global dimensions of values based on respondent answers in the WVS. 
The first was a collectivist/individualistic value dimension, and the second 
dimension was egoism/altruism. After actors completed the group project, I 
asked them to answer these same questions used by Welzel.  
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 Table 6.4 compares the means for answers from the social values 
questionnaire by experimental condition. The above table shows limited 
evidence that social context affects the values held by actors. First, only one 
question that measured individualism vs collectivism values was significantly 
different between conditions. Actors reported significantly higher levels of self-
direction after receiving personality reports that described them as 
competitive instead of cooperative. None of the other three questions from 
this set of values significantly differed by condition.  
 Second, Table 6.4 shows significant differences for one question from 
the egoism versus altruism set of values. Actors reported significantly higher 
levels of benevolence when they received cooperative rather than competitive 
personality reports. For the other questions in this set, the above table shows 
no significant differences. Third, the results from a pearson’s pairwise 
correlation shows no significant relationship between levels of cohesion and the 
answers that actors gave to the self-direction (r = -0.028; p = .398, one-tailed) 
nor the benevolence questions (r = .095; p = .326, one-tailed). Put simply, 
there is limited evidence that features of context operate through the social 
values of actors to affect cohesion in groups. 
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Discussion 
 The results from Study 1 support most of my predictions. In support of 
hypothesis 1, I found that actors contributed more resources to a group 
project when they received a report describing their personality as cooperative 
instead of competitive. I also found support for hypothesis 2 with actors 
sending less punishment points to their partners after receiving a cooperative 
instead of competitive personality report.  
 I did not find support for hypothesis 3 on the facial expressions of 
emotions by actors. The expressions of “joy” was significantly higher for actors 
with competitive rather than cooperative personality reports. I also found 
that “neutral” expressions were significantly higher for actors with reports 
describing their personality as cooperative instead of competitive. This neutral 
category represents expressions on faces without contracted muscles or 
movements. It represents an emotionless facial expression. In general, 
competitive contexts evoked more emotions in the faces of actors than 
cooperative contexts (i.e. neutral). However, there was little variation between 
conditions for the specific types of emotions (e.g. contempt, disgust, or anger).  
 I did find evidence in support of hypothesis 4, which predicted that 
actors would report more positive feelings in groups with cooperative rather 
than competitive contexts. That finding raises questions about the difference 
between the emotional expressions of actors and their answers to questions 
about these emotions. There were several limitations with the collection of 
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data for these emotional expressions, however. I discuss these limitations later 
in this dissertation. 
 In support of hypothesis 5, I found that actors reported significantly 
higher levels of trust, commitment, and cohesion in groups when they received 
cooperative rather than competitive personality reports. I also found evidence 
in support of hypotheses 6 and 7 using separate mediation analyses. In 
support of hypothesis 6, I found evidence that average contributions to the 
group project significantly mediated the relationship between social context 
and group cohesion. Similarly, I found support for hypothesis 7 with 
punishment of partners mediating this same relationship.  
 Finally, I did not find convincing evidence for an alternative 
explanation: that features of social context affect the identity standards 
referenced by actors. I found non-significant differences between conditions for 
most answers that actors gave to questions about their social values. I did find 
significant differences in answers for two of the social value questions. 
However, there were non-signifiant relationships between these answers and 
levels of group cohesion.  
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Chapter 7:  Study 2 - Relational Context  
Design and Participants 
Study 2 is a two-condition, between-subjects design where I randomly 
assigned participants to group tasks that referred to their partners as 
collaborators or competitors. The study had 94 students from a large public-
university located in the mid-Atlantic region of the U.S. I removed eight 
participants from my final analysis who incorrectly reported that their 
computer referred to partners as collaborators rather than competitors or 
vice-versa. The remaining sample size after removing those who failed the 
manipulation check was 86 participants (61 women and 25 men). 
Manipulation and Procedures 
 Participants in Study 2 volunteered for the experiment using the same 
online registration system from the last study. Similar to my last study, I 
scheduled participants for sessions with six to 15 people in computer labs on 
campus. When participants arrived for sessions, experimenters gave them 
unique identification numbers and showed them where to sit in the labs. The 
study required all participants to sign standard consent forms before they 
began this second study. 
 After participants signed their consent forms, I presented on the 
instructions of the study. The presentation that I gave in Study 2 was the 
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same one that I gave in my first study (See Appendix B for this presentation). 
The slides used in my presentation were similar to the instructions that 
participants saw on their computer screens. When I finished my presentation, 
the participants in study 2 started the group task.  
 I randomly assigned participant to groups where the task referred to 
their partners as collaborators or competitors (See Appendix C). The 
manipulation affected two components of the group task. First, the 
instructions either referred to partners of participants as competitors or 
collaborators. Second, the group task used one of these two words during each 
period of exchange.  Third, the study asked participants to reflect about 
working with collaborators or competitors in groups. The slide continued by 
asking participants to describe the role of competition or collaboration in their 
own group using examples. I gave participants one minute to complete this 
reflection exercise.  I used the reflection exercise to strengthen the 18
manipulation for participants in study 2. 
 One concern is that participants would reflect on competitive or collaborative groups they 18
were part of in the past, not the groups in study 2. If participants chose to write about the 
former, it may confound the effects of present group context with prior contexts. I did not 
find evidence of this confounding effect. All but five participants mentioned past experiences. 
Of the five participants who wrote about past group experiences, only two participants wrote 
more than one sentence about their prior experiences in competitive or collaborative groups. 
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Dependent Measures 
Contributions. – Similar to my last study, each period of the public 
goods game began with actors receiving an endowment of 20 tokens. The 
contribution measure is the percentage of these 20 tokens that actors decided 
to transfer into a shared pool. On average, participants in study 2 contributed 
50% of their endowment into the shared pool across the 24 periods of the 
public goods game.  
Punishment. – After making decisions about contributions into a 
shared pool, actors viewed a new screen on their computers telling them how 
much they and their partners contributed into the shared pool. Next, actors 
made a second decision about anonymously punishing their partners. Actors 
could spend one of their own tokens to send two deduction points to partners 
of their choosing. The game allowed participants to send up to 20 deduction 
points (costing them 10 tokens) to each of their partners without their 
partners knowing who punished whom.  On average, participants in study 2 
sent their partners 10% of the total number of deduction points allocated to 
them by the game. 
Facial Recognition of Emotions - Similar to my previous study, I used 
web cameras to record the facial expressions of participants as they completed 
the group project (Valstar and Pantic 2012).  I trimmed the last four minutes 
of the videos and then analyzed them using the CERT software. The software 
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measured levels of joy, surprise, contempt, sadness, disgust, fear, anger, and 
there was a neutral expression category. CERT assigns a number to each 
category that ranges from 0 to 1.0, with the total values for all categories 
equaling a total of 1.0. 
Positive Affect. – I measured positive affect using an index of three 
questions asking participants about their general feelings during the group 
project. Two of these questions asked participants, “In general, how would you 
describe your feelings towards Participant #[1/2] during the experiment?” 
using a seven-point scale [1 = “Very negative” / 7 = “Very positive”].  A third 
question asked participants, “How much do you feel that you and the other 
participants worked well together?” with answer choices ranging along a seven-
point [1 = “Not at all” / 7 = “Very much”]. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
of reliability for the positive affect index is 0.65. 
Trust. – I measured trust using an index of three questions. Two of 
these questions asked participants, “How much did you trust Participant 
#[1/2]?” using a seven-point scale [1 = Not at all / 7 = A lot]. The third 
question asked participants, “How much did you trust the other participants?” 
using another seven-point scale [1 = Not at all / 7 = Very much].  The 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability for the trust index is 0.71. 
Commitment. – I measured commitment using an index of three 
questions. Two of these questions asked participants, “How committed where 
you to Participant #[1/2]?” using a seven-point scale [1 = Not at all / 7 = A 
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lot]. The third question asked participants, “How committed were you to the 
other participants?” using another seven-point scale [1 = Not at all / 7 = 
Very much]. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability for the 
commitment index is 0.78. 
Cohesion. – I measured cohesion using an index of six answer choices 
to the same question asking participants, “Think about the relationship you 
and the other participants had during the group task. How would you describe 
the relationship on each of the following?” Participants used a nine-point scale 
for each of the following answer choices: Distant/Close, Conflictual/
Cooperative, Fragmenting/Integrating, Fragile/Solid, Divisive/Cohesive, and 
Self-Oriented/Team-Oriented. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability 
for the cohesion index is 0.92. 
 Personal Identity Standard. – Similar to my first study, I used the 
adapted version of Schwartz’s (2007) personal value questionnaire that is used 
by the World Values Survey. The questionnaire told participants, “You will see 
statements that describe some people. Please indicate for each description 
whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not 
like you, or not at all like you.” It then asked them to use five-point scales to 
rate their value orientation to: achievement, benevolence, conformity, 
hedonism, power, security, self-direction, stimulation, tradition, and 
universalism. 
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Figure 7.1 Average Percent of Contributions to the Group by Partner Type 
Generosity 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts that actors will contribute more tokens to the 
group project when these groups refer to their partners as collaborators rather 
than competitors. The results in Figure 7.1 support my prediction. This figure 
displays the average percent of contributions to the group during the 24 
periods of the group task. The gray lines represents actors in groups that 
referred to their partners as “collaborators”; while the black line are those in 
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Figure 7.1 Average Percent of Contributions to the Group by Partner Type
consistent difference in contributions over time by condition assignment. Table 
7.1 tests whether these differences are statistically significant. 
 The results in Table 7.1 support my prediction: actors with 
collaborators as partners gave 61% of their tokens to the group on average, 
while those with partners described as competitors gave 38% of their 
endowment to the group. That difference was statistically significant (t = 
3.56; p<.001, one-tailed).   Table 7.1 shows significant differences for each 19 20
 These differences could be a function of “group effects” where generosity by a few actors 19
leads their partners to behave generously too. I ran two separate Analysis of Covariance 
(ANCOVA) models that attempted to control for these effects. The first model controlled for 
contributions by actors relative to their partners. After controlling for these relative 
contributions, I still found similar differences between experimental conditions (F = 16.49; 
p<.001 one-tailed). The second model controlled for average contributions from both partners 
of actors. After controlling for partners’ contributions, I still found evidence that actors were 
more generous in cooperative rather than competitive conditions (F = 18.26; p<.001, one-
tailed).
 I found similar results after controlling for the gender of actors.20
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Table 7.1  T-Tests for Average Contributions to the Group
Periods Collaborators Competitors t
1 to 6 58% 42% 2.75**
7 to 12 62% 38% 3.81***
13 to 18 65% 36% 4.29***
19 to 24 59% 38% 3.02***
All Periods 61% 38% 3.56***
N 44 42
Notes. – * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; One-tailed probabilities reported.
quartile of the group task. For periods one to six, actors with collaborators as 
partners gave 58% of their endowment compared with 42% given by those 
with competitors as partners (t = 2.75; p = .004, one-tailed). Those with 
collaborators as partners gave 62% of their endowment in periods 7 to 12, 
compared to actors with competitors as partners who gave 38% (t = 3.81; p<.
001, one-tailed). 
 For periods 13 to 18, a similar pattern exists: actors with collaborators 
as partners gave 65% to the group, while those with competitors as partners 
gave 36% (t = 4.29; p<.001, one-tailed). In the last quartile, actors gave 59% 
of their tokens to the group project, while those with competitors as partners 
gave 38% of their tokens to the group (t = 3.56; p<.001, one-tailed). 
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Figure 7.2 Average Percentage of Punishment toward Partners by Partner Type
Punishment 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that actors will spend fewer resources to punish 
partners described as collaborators rather than competitors. The results in 
Figure 7.2 support my prediction. Similar to my previous figures, the gray line 
represents actors with partners described as collaborators; while the black line 
are those with partners described as competitors. The over-time pattern in 
this figure shows that actors punished their partners more when the game 
called them competitors versus collaborators over time. The results in Table 
7.2 test if these differences are statistically significant. 
   
  
 The results in Table 7.2 support my prediction: actors with 
collaborator partners used 5% of their punishment points against others, while 
those with competitor partners used 15% of these points. That difference was 
statistically significant (t = -5.02; p<.001, one-tailed). However, the percent of 
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Table 7.2  T-Tests for Average Punishment of Partners
Periods Collaborator Competitors t
1 to 6 6% 13% -2.86***
7 to 12 6% 15% -3.66***
13 to 18 4% 16% -6.18***
19 to 24 6% 16% -4.57***
All Periods 5% 15% -5.02***
N 44 43
Notes. – *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; One-tailed probabilities reported.
punishment points that actors sent to their partners may be a function of who 
gave how much to their groups. I ran a separate ANCOVA model that 
controls for the average total amount of tokens that partners of actors 
contributed to the group. After controlling for the behaviors of these partners, 
I still found that actors spent significantly less resources to punish their 
partners in cooperative rather than competitive conditions (F = 18.26; p<.
001).    21 22
 The above table shows significant differences between conditions for 
each quartile of the group task. Between periods one to six, actors sent 6% of 
their punishment points to collaborator partners versus the 13% they sent to 
partners described as competitors (t = -2.86; p = .005, one-tailed). For 
periods seven to 12, actors sent 6% of their punishment points to collaborator 
partners while actors sent  15% of these points sent to competitor partners (t 
= -3.66; p<.001, one-tailed).  
 The differences between conditions for the last two quartiles were also 
statistically significant. Between periods 13 to 18, actors used 4% of their 
 I ran two separate ANCOVA models that attempt to control for “group effects.” The first 21
model controlled for absolute contributions to the group by actors and the interaction effect 
between these contributions and condition assignment. After controlling for these 
contributions and the interaction effect between these contributions and condition assignment, 
I still found significant differences between condition assignment in punishment of partners (F 
= 11.04; p<.001, one-tailed). The second of these models controlled for relative contributions 
to the group by actors and the interaction between these contributions and condition 
assignment. After controlling for these factors, I still found similar differences in punishment 
by condition assignment (F = 24.10; p<.001, one-tailed).
 I found similar results after controlling for the gender of actors.22
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allotment of punishment points against collaborator partners to the 16% used 
by actors with competitor partners (t = -6.18; p<.001, one-tailed). For the 
last quartile, actors used 6% of their allotted punishment points against 
partners described as collaborators. In comparison, actors used 16% of this 
allotment to punish their partners described as competitors. That difference 
was also statistically significant (t = -4.57; p<.001, one-tailed).  
Positive Affect 
 Hypothesis 3 predicts that networks with cooperative contexts will 
cause actors to express more positive emotional expressions in their faces than 
networks with competitive contexts. Table 7.3 displays the measures of 
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Table 7.3  Facial Expressions of Emotions by Partner Type
Emotion Collaborator Competitor t-value
Joy 0.007 (.011) 0.012 (.016) -1.71*
Surprise 0.007 (.014) 0.028 (.093) -1.43
Contempt 0.247 (.129) 0.305 (.171) -1.73*
Neutral 0.515 (.123) 0.485 (.155) 0.960
Sadness 0.104 (.089) 0.102 (.083) 0.130
Disgust 0.040 (.052) 0.037 (.058) 0.304
Fear 0.003 (.004) 0.004 (.022) -0.095
Anger 0.077 (.113) 0.040 (.059) 1.862*
Total 1.000 1.013
N 40 43
Notes. –  *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; One-tailed probabilities reported.  
Totals over 1.000 due to rounding error.
emotional expressions in the faces of participants during the last four minutes 
of the group task. The table shows little support for Hypothesis 3. We see 
higher levels of contempt expressed in the faces of actors with competitors 
rather than collaborators as partners (t=-1.73; p = .043, one-tailed). The 
above table also shows that actors with collaborators as partners expressed 
significantly lower levels of joy (t = -1.71; p = .045, one-tailed) and higher 
levels of anger (t = 1.86; p = .033, one-tailed) compared to those with 
competitor partners. There were non-significant differences for the other 
measures of emotions that CERT measured. 
 Hypothesis 4 predicts that cooperative contexts will cause actors to 
report feelings that are more positive about the group project than networks 
with competitive contexts. I used an index of three questions that asked 
actors to rate their general feelings during the group project. Results support 
my prediction: actors reported significantly higher levels of positive affect 
when they had partners described as collaborators (M = 4.43; SD = 1.06) 
instead of competitors (M = 3.92; SD = 1.01) (F = 5.08; p = .013, one-
tailed). 
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Figure 7.3  Means of Trust, Commitment, and Cohesion by Partner Type 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
Social Solidarity 
 Hypothesis 5 predicts that actors will report higher levels of social 
solidarity in networks that refer to their partners as collaborators rather than 
competitors. Figure 7.3 displays the means for each of the three measures of 
social solidarity. In support of Hypothesis 5, I find significant differences 
between conditions for measures of trust, commitment, and cohesion using 
one-way ANOVA models. Actors with collaborators as partners reported 
significantly higher levels of trust than actors with competitor partners (F = 
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Figure 7.3 Means of Trust, Commitment, and Cohesion by Partner Type
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commitment for actors with partners as collaborators rather than competitors 
(F = 3.55; p = .031, one-tailed). Finally, I found that group cohesion is 
significantly higher when actors have collaborators instead of competitors as 
their partners (F = 10.78; p = .002, one-tailed).  
   
Figure 7.4  Mediation Analysis for Group Contributions 
Contributions and Punishment as Mediators 
Hypothesis 6 predicts that contributions to the group project by actors 
will mediate the relationship between social context (partners described as 
collaborators rather than competitors) and cohesion in groups. Figure 7.4 
displays the results of a mediation analysis that finds support for my 
prediction. First, there is a significant relationship between type of partner 
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significantly affects the mediator, group contribution (β = .23; t = 3.87; p<.
001, one-tailed). Third, the mediator (group contribution) significantly affects 
cohesion after controlling for type of partner (β = 3.26; t = 5.99; p<.001, 
onetailed). Fourth, results from a Sobel mediation test show that group 
contributions significantly mediated the effect of partner type on cohesion (z 
= 3.33; p<.001, one-tailed). Thus, the results in Figure 7.4 show that 
generosity toward the group transmits the effect of social context on group 
cohesion. 
Figure 7.5  Mediation Analysis for Punishment of Partners 
 Hypothesis 7 predicts that punishment of partners by actors will 
mediate the relationship between social context and group cohesion. Figure 
7.5 displays support for this prediction based on results from a second 
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significantly affects cohesion (β = 1.15; t = 3.22; p<.001, one-tailed). Second, 
there is a significant relationship between partner type and punishment of 
partners by actors (β = -.10; t = 4.95; p<.001, one-tailed). Third, the 
mediator (punishment of partners) significantly affects cohesion (β = -3.54; t 
= -1.82; p = .037, one-tailed). Finally, the results from a Sobel mediation test 
show that punishment of partners significantly transmits the effect of social 
context on group cohesion (z = 1.71; p = .044, one-tailed). 
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Table 7.4 Means of Social Value Questions by Partner Type
Collaborator Competitor t-value
Collectivism vs. Individualism
Conformity 3.16 (1.23) 3.23 (1.00) -0.289
Security 3.60 (1.00) 3.60 (.98) 0.000
Self-Direction 4.00 (.87) 4.00 (.76) 0.000
Stimulation 3.60 (.96) 3.65 (.95) -0.227
Egoism vs. Altruism
Universalism 3.56 (1.10) 3.30 (1.06) 1.100
Benevolence 4.21 (.83) 4.33 (.57) -0.758
Achievement 3.93 (1.06) 3.77 (.75) 0.824
Power 2.88 (1.00) 2.91 (.83) -0.116
N 43 43
Notes. – *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; One-tailed probabilities reported.   
Alternative Explanation: Changing Personal Identities 
 Similar to my first study, I had actors complete an adapted version of 
Schwartz’s (2007) value scale found in the World Value Survey (WVS). The 
10-question survey measured two universal values: individualism versus 
collectivism and egoism versus altruisms. The purpose of this scale was to test 
whether or not social context affects group cohesion by changing the identity 
standards that actors referenced during the public goods game. Table 7.4 
displays results that do not support this alternative argument. This table 
shows no significant difference between conditions for participant answers to 
each of the social value questions. The results from pairwise correlations 
between cohesion and each answer from the social value questions were mostly 
non-significant. The exception to this statement was a positive correlation 
between cohesion and levels of benevolence (r = .117; p = ..072, one-tailed). 
Thus, it is doubtful that social context operates via the social value of 
benevolence (or the other values) to shape group cohesion.  
 
Discussion 
 The results from study 2 support most of predictions. In support of 
hypothesis 1, I found that actors contributed more resources to groups with 
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partners described as collaborators instead of competitors. In support of 
hypothesis 2, I found the opposite relationship: actors spent more resources to 
punish competitors instead of collaborators as partners.  
 I found limited evidence in support of hypothesis 3 on the effects that 
social context had on facial expressions of emotions by actors. Expressions of 
contempt were higher in the factors of actors with partners described as 
competitors instead of collaborators. However, I found limited evidence in 
support of my prediction for the other measures of emotive expressions. 
 In support of hypothesis 4, actors with partners described as 
collaborators reported significantly higher levels of positive affect than 
individuals with competitors as partners. Further, I found evidence in support 
of hypothesis 5 with actors reporting higher levels of trust, commitment, and 
cohesion in the collaborator versus competitor conditions. The results from 
mediation analyses support my predictions in hypotheses 6 and 7, with 
contributions to the group and punishment of partners mediating the 
relationship between social context and group cohesion. Finally, I failed to 
find support for the alternative explanation that social context changes the 
identity standards of actors. There were no significant differences between 
experimental conditions for answers that actors gave to the social value 
questionnaires.  
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Chapter 8:  Study 3 - Group Context  
Design and Participants 
Study 3 is a two-condition, between-subjects design where I randomly 
assigned participants to group tasks that defined the goals of their group by 
cooperation and teamwork versus competition and individualism. The study 
had 87 students a large public-university in the mid-Atlantic region. I 
excluded three participants from my final analyses who incorrectly reported 
the goals of their group. The remaining sample size was 84 participants (54 
women and 30 men). 
Manipulation and Procedures 
 Participants in Study 3 used the same online registration system from 
my prior two studies. Similar to my other studies, I scheduled participants for 
sessions with six to 15 people in computer labs on campus. When participants 
arrived for sessions, experimenters gave them unique identification numbers 
and showed them where to sit in the labs. The study required all participants 
to sign standard consent forms before they began study 3. 
 After participants signed their consent forms, I presented on the 
instructions of the study. The presentation that I gave in study 3 was the 
same one that I gave in my first two studies (See Appendix A). The slides 
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used in my presentation were similar to the instructions that participants saw 
on their computer screens. These slides explained that study 3 simulates how 
employees for a company make decisions at work. It displayed a logo for a 
fictitious company, named Looking Glass Incorporated (hereafter LGI), on 
their computer screen. The introductory instructions stated that LGI was 
founded in 1932 with a focus on one of two type of core values: “Teamwork, 
Cooperation, Results” or “Individuals, Cooperation, Results” (See Appendix 
E). Throughout the experiment, participants saw one of the two logos 
displayed in Figure 8.1 
Figure 8.1 Logos for Looking Glass Incorporated  
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 The group task in study 3 was the same one that I used in my previous 
two studies, except for three differences. First, the instructions discussed a 
fictitious company, named Looking Glass Incorporated. Second, this 
experiment asked participants to write the three core values of this company. 
Third, participants saw one of the two logos displayed in Figure 8.1 on their 
screens. 
Dependent Measures 
Contributions. – Similar to my last two studies, each period of the 
public goods game began with actors receiving an endowment of 20 tokens. 
This contribution measure is the percent of these 20 tokens that actors 
decided to transfer into a shared pool. On average, participants in study 3 
contributed 47% of their endowment into the shared pool across the 24 
periods of the public goods game.  
Punishment. – After making decisions about contributions to a shared 
pool, actors viewed a new screen telling them how much they and their 
partners contributed into this pool. Next, actors made a second decision about 
anonymously punishing their partners. Actors could spend one of their own 
tokens to send two deduction points to partners of their choosing. The game 
allowed participants to send up to 20 deduction points (costing them 10 
tokens) to each of their partners without their partners knowing who punished 
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whom.  On average, participants in study 3 sent their partners 11% of the 
total number of deduction points allocated to them by the game. 
Facial Recognition of Emotions - Similar to my previous study, I used 
web cameras to record the facial expressions of participants as they completed 
the group project (Valstar and Pantic 2012). I trimmed the last four minutes 
of the videos and then analyzed them using the CERT software. The software 
measured levels of joy, surprise, contempt, sadness, disgust, fear, anger, and 
there was a neutral expression category. CERT assigns a number to each 
category that ranges from 0 to 1.0, with the total values for all categories 
equaling a total of 1.0. 
Positive Affect. – I measured positive affect using an index of three 
questions asking participants about their general feelings during the group 
project. Two of these questions asked participants, “In general, how would you 
describe your feelings towards Participant #[1/2] during the experiment?” 
using a seven-point scale [1 = “Very negative” / 7 = “Very positive”].  A third 
question asked participants, “How much do you feel that you and the other 
participants worked well together?” with answer choices ranging along a seven-
point [1 = “Not at all” / 7 = “Very much”]. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
of reliability for the positive affect index is 0.63. 
Trust. – I measured trust using an index of three questions. Two of 
these questions asked participants, “How much did you trust Participant 
#[1/2]?” using a seven-point scale [1 = Not at all / 7 = A lot]. The third 
!  97
question asked participants, “How much did you trust the other participants?” 
using another seven-point scale [1 = Not at all / 7 = Very much].  The 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability for the trust index is 0.61. 
Commitment. – I measured commitment using an index of three 
questions. Two of these questions asked participants, “How committed where 
you to Participant #[1/2]?” using a seven-point scale [1 = Not at all / 7 = A 
lot]. The third question asked participants, “How committed were you to the 
other participants?” using another seven-point scale [1 = Not at all / 7 = 
Very much]. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability for the 
commitment index is 0.69. 
Cohesion. – I measured cohesion using an index of six answer choices 
to the same question asking participants, “Think about the relationship you 
and the other participants had during the group task. How would you describe 
the relationship on each of the following?” Participants using a nine-point 
scale for each of the following answer choices: Distant/Close, Conflictual/
Cooperative, Fragmenting/Integrating, Fragile/Solid, Divisive/Cohesive, and 
Self-Oriented/Team-Oriented. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability 
for the cohesion index is 0.90. 
 Personal Identity Standard. – Similar to my first two studies, I used the 
adapted version of Schwartz’s (2007) personal value questionnaire used by the 
World Values Survey. The questionnaire told participants, “You will see 
statements that describe some people. Please indicate for each description 
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whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not 
like you, or not at all like you.” It then asked them to use five-point scales to 
rate their value orientation for: achievement, benevolence, conformity, 
hedonism, power, security, self-direction, stimulation, tradition, and 
universalism.  
Figure 8.2  Average Percent of Contributions to the Group by Goal Type 
Generosity 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts that actors will contribute more tokens to the 
group project when the goals of their group focus on cooperation rather than 
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Figure 8.2 Average Percent of Contributions to the Group by Group Goal
displays the average percent of contributions to the group during 24 periods of 
exchange. Similar to my last two studies, the gray line represent actors in 
groups with goals that emphasize cooperation; while the black line are groups 
with goals that focus on competition. We see a different pattern of results 
from my last two studies. The figure shows that contributions by condition 
assignment were closer together in the first part of the group task. During the 
second half of the group task, Figure 8.2 shows a divergence in contributions 
between the two conditions. Table 8.1 tests whether these differences are 
statistically significant for each quartile of the group task.  
 The results in Table 8.1 support my first prediction: actors in 
cooperative groups contributed an average of 55% of their endowment to the 
group project, while those in competitive groups contributed 40% of this 
endowment. That difference was statistically significant (t = 2.65; p = .005, 
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Table 8.1  T-Tests for Average Contributions to the Group
Periods Cooperation Competition t-value
1 to 6 52% 44% 1.482+
7 to 12 53% 42% 1.824*
13 to 18 56% 35% 3.336***
19 to 24 58% 38% 3.144**
All Periods 55% 40% 2.65**
N 43 41  
Notes. – +p<.10; *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; One-tailed probabilities reported.
one-tailed).   The above table shows that condition assignment had a 23 24
moderately significant effect on contributions to the group during the first 
quartile of the group task. In periods one to six, actors in cooperative groups 
gave 52% of their endowments to the 44% given by those in competitive 
groups (t = 1.482; p = .071, one-tailed). Between periods seven to 12, we see 
a difference in generosity was significant with actors in cooperative groups 
contributing 53% of their endowment to the 42% contributed by those in 
competitive groups (t = 1.824; p = .035, one-tailed). 
 The differences in generosity becomes more noticeable in the last 
quartiles of the group task. Between periods 13 to 18, Table 8.1 shows that 
actors in cooperative conditions contributed 56% of their endowment to the 
group while those in the competitive conditions gave 35% of their endowment 
(t = 3.336; p<.001, one-tailed). In the last quartile of the task, a similar 
difference exists in generosity.  Actors in groups with cooperative goal gave 
58% of their endowment, while those in groups with competitive goals 
 These differences could be a function of “group effects” where generosity by a few actors 23
leads their partners to behave generously too. I ran two separate Analysis of Covariance 
(ANCOVA) models that attempted to control for these effects. The first model controlled for 
contributions by actors relative to their partners. After controlling for these relative 
contributions, I still found similar differences between experimental conditions (F = 25.36; 
p=.002, one-tailed). The second model controlled for average contributions from both 
partners of actors. After controlling for partners’ contributions, I found limited evidence that 
actors were more generous in cooperative rather than competitive conditions (F = 1.57; p<.
107, one-tailed).
 I found similar results after controlling for the gender of actors.24
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contributed 38%. That difference was also statistically significant (t = 3.14; p 
= .005, one-tailed). 
Figure 8.3  Average Percent of Punishment Toward Partners by Goal Type  
Punishment 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that actors will spend fewer resources to punish 
partners in groups with goals defined by cooperation versus competition. The 
results in Figure 8.2 do not support this prediction. This figure displays the 
average percentage of punishment points sent to partners in groups with goals 
defined by cooperation or competition. Similar to the last figure, the gray line 
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Figure 8.2 Average Percent of Punishment Toward Partners by Group Goal
the black line are those in groups with competitive goals. The punishment of 
partners do not appear to vary much between experimental conditions. Table 
8.2 tests whether this pattern was statistically significant. 
 The results in Table 8.2 do not support my prediction. Actors in 
cooperative groups spent 11% of their allotment of punishment points 
throughout the group task to the 12% spent by those in competitive groups. 
That difference was non-significant (t = -.438; p = .332, one-tailed). I ran a 
separate ANCOVA model that controlled for the average total amount of 
contributions to the group by partners. After controlling for these 
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Table 8.2  T-Tests for Average Punishment of Partners
Periods Cooperation Competition t-value
1 to 6 11% 10% 0.592
7 to 12 10% 14% -1.225
13 to 18 9% 12% -0.772
19 to 24 11% 11% 0.054
All Periods 11% 12% -0.438
N 43 41  
Notes. – *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; One-tailed probabilities reported.
contributions, I still found non-significant differences between conditions for 
punishment of partners in groups (F = 0.78; p = .190).    25 26
 We see a similar pattern of non-significance for each quartile of the 
group task. Between periods one to six, actors in cooperative groups gave 11% 
of their allotted punishment points and those in competitive groups gave 10% 
(t = .592; p = .278, one-tailed). For periods seven to 12, actors in groups with 
cooperative goals spent 10% of their allotment to punish others, while those in 
groups with competitive goals spent 14% (t = -1.225; p = .112, one-tailed). 
 Table 8.2 shows the same pattern of non-significance between 
conditions during the last quartiles of the group task. For periods 13 to 18, 
actors in the cooperative condition spent 9% of their allotment of punishment 
points to the 12% spent by those in the competitive condition (t = 0.772; p = 
.442, one-tailed). In the last quartile, actors in cooperative and competitive 
conditions both spent 11% of their allotment to punish their partners (t = 
0.054; p = .479, one-tailed).  So far, these results indicate that group context 
does not significantly affect how actors view the function of resources. While 
generosity was significantly higher in groups with cooperative rather than 
 I ran two separate ANCOVA models that attempt to control for “group effects.” The first 25
model controlled for absolute contributions to the group by actors. After controlling for these 
contributions and the interaction effect between these contributions and condition assignment, 
I still found non-significant differences between condition assignments for punishment of 
partners (F = .01; p=.454, one-tailed). The second of these models controlled for relative 
contributions to the group by actors and the interaction between these contributions and 
condition assignment. After controlling for these factors, I still found non-significant 
differences in punishment by condition assignment (F = 0.19; p=.331, one-tailed). 
 I found similar results after controlling for the gender of actors.26
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competitive goals, I found no significant difference in the levels that actors 
relied on punishment between these conditions. 
Positive Affect 
 Hypothesis 3 predicts that groups with goals defined by cooperation 
will cause actors to express more positive emotional expressions in their faces 
than groups with competitive goals. Table 8.3 displays the measures of 
emotions in the faces of actors. The results generally do not support 
Hypothesis 3.  The table shows no significant differences in joy, surprise, 
contempt, sadness disgust, sadness, fear, or anger. There is some evidence 
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Table 8.3  Facial Expressions of Emotions by Group Goal
Emotion Cooperative Competitive t-value
Joy 0.011 (.015) 0.012 (.013) 0.453
Surprise 0.016 (.027) 0.016 (.031) -0.080
Contempt 0.266 (.152) 0.273 (.162) 0.179
Neutral 0.466 (.140) 0.407 (.139) -1.928*
Sadness 0.132 (.087) 0.173  (.163) 1.461
Disgust 0.046 (.103) 0.057 (.113) 0.468
Fear 0.008 ( .008) 0.014 (.027) 1.365
Anger 0.054 (.064) 0.048 (.071) -0.434
Total 0.999 1.000
N 43 41
Notes. – *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; One-tailed probabilities reported.  
Totals under 1.000 is due to rounding error.
that actors expressed more “neutral” expressions when located in the 
cooperative rather than competitive condition (t = -1.928; p = .029, one-
tailed). 
 Hypothesis 4 predicts that groups with cooperative goals will cause 
actors to report more positive feelings than groups with goals defined by 
competition. I measured positive affect using an index of three questions that 
asked actors about their overall feelings and how they felt toward each of their 
partners. In support of hypothesis 4, I found that actors reported significantly 
higher levels of positive affect in the cooperative (M = 4.22; SD = 1.05) 
rather than competitive (M = 3.75; SD = 1.08) condition (F  = 4.05; p = .
024, one-tailed). 
Figure 8.4  Means of Trust, Commitment, and Cohesion by Goal Type 
 (Standard Deviations in Parentheses)  
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Figure 8.4 Means of Trust, Commitment, and Cohesion by Group Goal




 Hypothesis 5 predicts that actors will report higher levels of social 
solidarity in networks with group goals defined by cooperation instead of 
competition. Figure 8.4 displays the means and standard deviations for three 
components of social solidarity. In general, the results in this figure do not 
support my prediction. In support of my prediction, I did find significant 
differences for trust using a one-way ANOVA model. Actors in groups with 
cooperative goals reported significantly higher levels of interpersonal trust 
than actors located in competitive groups (F = 3.23; p = .038, one-tailed).  
 However, I did not find significant differences between conditions for 
the commitment and cohesion indices. The results from one-way ANOVA 
models show that actors in groups with cooperative goals were no more likely 
than actors in competitive groups to report higher levels of commitment (F = 
1.42; p = .118, one-tailed). Similarly, results also show no significant difference 
for levels of cohesion between conditions (F = 0.77; p = .192, one-tailed). 
Contributions and Punishment as Mediators 
 A necessary condition for mediation analysis is a significant 
relationship between an independent and dependent variable (Baron and 
Kenny 1986). The results in Figure 8.4 show that groups with goals defined by 
cooperation or competition did not significantly affect levels of cohesion. Thus, 
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no significant variation exists between levels of the independent variable 
(cooperative versus competitive group goals) on the dependent variable 
(cohesion) that a mediator (percent of contributions, or punishment toward, 
partners) could account for.  
 Hypothesis 6 predicts that contributions to the group project would 
significantly mediate the relationship between group context and cohesion. 
Hypothesis 7 predicts that punishment of partners by actors will also mediate 
the relationship between group context and cohesion in groups. Study 3 does 
not find support for either of these two predictions. 
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Table 8.4  Means of Social Value Questions by Group Goal
Cooperation Competition t-value
Individualism vs. Collectivism
Conformity 3.40 (1.18) 3.15 (.79) 1.311
Security 3.79 (.94) 3.59 (.97) 0.983
Self-Direction 3.84 (.81) 3.98 (.85) -0.762
Stimulation 3.72 (1.08) 3.68 (.99) 0.169
Egoism vs. Altruism
Universalism 3.40 (1.07) 3.41 (1.26) -0.076
Benevolence 4.26 (.69) 4.39 (.77) -0.841
Achievement 3.77 (1.00) 3.78 (1.06) -0.058
Power 2.81 (1.05) 2.71 (.93) 0.492
N 43 41
Notes. – *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; One-tailed probabilities reported. 
Alternative Explanation: Changing Personal Identities 
 I had actors complete the same social value questions that were used in 
my first two studies. Table 8.4 displays the means for answers to these 
questions by condition assignment. The figure shows no significant differences 
for actors in groups with goals defined by cooperation or competition. The 
results from pairwise correlations between cohesion and answers to this social 
value questions were mostly non-significant. The exception was a negative 
correlations between cohesion and levels of power (r = -.220; p = .0221, one-
tailed). 
Discussion 
 I found limited evidence to support my proposed theory in study 3. In 
support of hypothesis 1, I did find that actors were more generous in groups 
with goals defined by cooperation instead of competition. However, I did not 
find support for hypothesis 2: the goals of groups did not significantly affect 
how much actors punished their partners, on average. I did not find much 
support for hypothesis 3 either. The facial expressions of emotions in the faces 
of actors largely did not significantly vary by condition assignment. The 
exception was a significant differences in “neutral” expressions defined as faces 
without contracted muscles or movements. Thus, cooperative contexts led 
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actors to express more muscle contractions and movements in comparison to 
competitive contexts.  
 In support of hypothesis 4, actors in cooperative contexts did report 
higher levels of positive affect than individuals in contexts that were 
competitive. I found limited evidence supporting hypothesis 5: levels of trust 
was higher in cooperative rather than competitive contexts, but there were no 
significant effects from my experimental manipulation on commitment nor 
cohesion. Since there were non-significant relationships between condition 
assignment and cohesion, there was nothing for average contributions to the 
group or punishment of partners to mediate. Thus, I did not find support for 
hypotheses 6 and 7 about the mediating role of exchange behaviors on group 
cohesion. Finally, I did not find evidence that social context affected the social 
values reported by participants after they completed the group task. 
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Chapter 9: Discussion 
 The question this project addressed was, how does social context affect 
the means by which actors promote collective action in groups? I began with 
the assumption that two methods exist for getting others to contribute their 
own resources for the public good: (1) actors give resources to the group and 
hope that others will do the same, too, and (2) actors punish their partners 
who may otherwise behave selfishly in these groups. I propose the degree that 
actors rely on generosity or punishment largely depends on subtle features of 
social context. And, how much actors rely on generosity versus punishment 
affects the formation of cohesion in groups. A proposed theory of context in 
social exchange describes a process where the subtle features that define how 
actors view themselves, others, and the group as a whole affect group 
cohesion. 
 Study 1 manipulated the context in which actors viewed themselves as 
cooperative or competitive. This first study gave actors a fictitious report 
about their personality traits and displayed the findings from this report on 
their computer screens during the group task. Results support most of the 
predictions based on my proposed theory. Actors behaved more generously 
and punished their partners less when they received cooperative instead of 
competitive personality reports. Consequently, actors with cooperative reports 
experienced more positive affect and higher levels of social solidarity in groups 
!  111
than actors with competitive reports. Mediation analyses shows that 
generosity mediated the relationship between social context by increasing 
levels of cohesion in groups. Further, results show that punishment mediated 
this relationship by reducing the effect of context on group cohesion. 
 Study 2 manipulated the context in which actors viewed their partners 
as collaborators or competitors. The group task in this study was no different 
than what I used in my first study, except for a change in one word: the task 
referred to partners as “collaborators” or “competitors” instead of  
“participants.” Results in support of predictions showed that changing this 
single word significantly affected the attitudes and behaviors of group 
members. Actors behaved more generously and punished their partners less in 
groups where these partners were called collaborators versus competitors. 
Further, actors reported higher levels of positive affect and social solidarity 
when they had collaborators instead of competitors as partners. Again, results 
from mediation analyses showed that generosity significantly mediated the 
effect of social context on cohesion. Punishment had the opposite effect by 
reducing cohesion in groups.   
 Study 3 manipulated the context in which actors viewed the goals of 
their group as cooperative or competitive. The task told actors this study is a 
simulation on how employees make decision at work for a fictitious company. 
It also told actors the values of this company were defined by “cooperation, 
teamwork, and results” or “competition, individualism, and results.” 
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Throughout the group task, actors saw a professional-looking logo of this 
company that displayed these values on their computer screens. Overall, 
results did not support my proposed theory. Actors in groups with goals 
defined by cooperation contributed significantly more to the public good, but 
the manipulation did not significantly affect how much actors punished their 
partners. Groups with cooperative goals did produce higher levels of positive 
affect and trust than groups with competitive goals. However, results showed 
no significant differences in commitment or cohesion between conditions. Since 
no significant relationship exists between the manipulation and cohesion, there 
was nothing to mediate in this relationship.  
 There are several alternative explanations that may explain why subtle 
features of context affected cohesion in my first two studies. First, social 
context may change the goals of actors during the group task. Put another 
way, actors may enter groups with the goal of resource accumulation but 
change these goals once they interact with others in cooperative or 
competitive contexts. I found limited evidence of this change in the answers 
that actors gave on a social value questionnaire. These non-finding may raise 
questions about measurement error in the questionnaire that actors completed 
after finishing the group task. However, the European Values Survey and the 
World Values Survey have found significant differences between countries 
using similar types of questions (Welzel 2009).  
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 There could be an endogeneity problem in the relationship between 
generosity, punishment, and cohesion during group tasks. If groups of actors 
are more generous, and their partners behaved less generously, the former may 
decide to punish the latter. I did not find evidence in support of this 
alternative explanation. First, I still found significant effects from condition 
assignment on generosity and punishment after controlling for average 
contributions in relation to the average contributions by their group. Second, I 
also found significant effects of condition assignment on punishment after 
controlling for the average generosity by actors and the average total 
contributions by their partners. 
 It could be that competitive contexts led actors to compete with their 
partners more than cooperative contexts. There are several limitations to this 
explanation. First, the tokens that participants exchanged in my experiments 
represented tickets for a raffle where the prize was $100 cash. The study 
instructions explicitly told participants their raffle was separate from those of 
their partners. These instructions also told participants that everyone in their 
group could win a cash prize from their separate raffles.  Second, there was no 
way for actors to know how much they earned relative to others who 
completed this experiment in the past. Without a way to compare their 
earnings, the fact that actors earned 100 or 1000 tokens has no meaning to 
them in and of itself. Third, I told actors they could not write down 
calculations during the group task. That rule prevented actors from 
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estimating how much their partners may have earned relative to themselves. 
Even if actors did make these comparisons with their partners, it would make 
no difference since they were earning tokens for tickets in raffles that were 
separate from their partners.  
 Finally, the manipulation itself may lead actors to believe that using 
generosity or punishment is the expected pattern of behavior for them in 
groups. In other words, my studies merely found effects from repeatedly 
framing each period of the group task. There are two reasons to conclude that 
my results are more than a repetition of “framing effects” versus a broader, 
identity process. First, I found few differences between conditions in the 
percent of contributions to the group nor punishment of partners in period 
one of the group task. Thus, it appears that subtle features of context had a 
gradual effect on the behaviors of actors over time, at least in my first two 
studies. Second, I found no significant effect of social context on several of my 
dependent variables in study 3, despite finding these effects in my first two 
studies. The lack of significant findings in my last study suggests that actors 
selectively chose what features of social context they will use to organize their 
perceptions of group tasks. Put simply, not all features of social context have 
the same effect on people. It is widely accepted in social psychology that 
people not only react to their surroundings, but also pro-actively engage and 
construct their reality (Cooley 1902; Mead 1934). The results from my 
experiments support this proposition: those in my first two studies selected to 
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organize their perceptions and behaviors around the context in which they 
viewed themselves and others, but others chose to ignore the context in which 
they viewed the group as a whole.  
Facial Expressions of Emotions 
 I did not find evidence in support of predictions about the facial 
expressions of emotions by actors.  There were several limitations with the 
implementation of this methodology during my experiments. First, I did not 
expect participants to obstruct the cameras on their computer screens. Some 
participants used their hands to cover part of their faces when they leaned in 
to look at their computer screens; others wore hats that blocked their 
foreheads, reducing the capacity to measure facial expressions by CERT; while 
some people in my studies tended to look away from the camera all together. 
Much of these behaviors were idiosyncratic of people in how they use 
computers. The result, however, was measurement error because I had fewer 
data points to measure using the CERT software. 
 Second, I used Microsoft Movie Maker software to record the videos of 
participant faces during the experiments. While the video recordings were the 
same for everyone in my studies, this software used different techniques for 
compressing the videos into a digital file. To reduce file size, this software 
compressed the videos using a “variable frame rate” that was different for each 
participant. For example, one file for a participant may capture 20 frames per 
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second in contrast to other files that recorded 10 or 30 frames per second. 
Even within the same video file, the frame rates varied with rates that were 
less than 10 per second in some parts and more than 30 in other parts. The 
CERT software measures the facial expressions for each frame, resulting in 
significant differences in sample sizes for each participant.  
 Third, I did not have the computing power to analyze the entire 30 
minutes of video recordings of participants in my study. Video recordings are 
sequences of multiple frames that a camera takes over time. For each 
participant, I recorded upwards of 150,000 frames during the entire 
experiment. That means study 1 would have a total sample size of 12.9 
million frames (150,000 frames per participant x 86 total participants = 
12,900,000) for analysis. The CERT software that I used to analyze my video 
files codes the faces of participants in each frame of these videos. I soon 
realized that my personal computer lacked the power to analyze these frames. 
If I were to replicate my studies again, I would need a more powerful 
computer equipped with a multi-core processor. For this reason, I chose to 
analyze the last four minutes of video for each participant. Consequently, the 
videos that I analyzed may not have fully capture the emotions that 
participants expressed during the entirety of my experiments. 
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Limitations 
 There are several limitations with this research that are worth 
mentioning. First, my results were found within the artificial context of 
laboratory experiments using samples of undergraduate students. It is for this 
reason that one cannot generalize from my samples to larger populations of 
adults. These limits aside, the controlled environment of experiments allowed 
me to test a specific process identified by my proposed theory. Second, my 
experiments only asked participants questions about their perceived levels of 
trust, commitment, and cohesion in groups. I did not include questions asking 
participants about how much they believed their partners developed trust, 
commitment, of cohesion during group tasks. It is possible that perceptions of 
these outcomes as reported by actors are partly a function of how they formed 
their own beliefs about social solidarity in groups. 
 Third, I had several problems in measuring the facial expressions of 
emotions for actors. These limitations were discussed in detail above. Some 
problems included issues with the frame rates used during video recording, 
participants obstructing their faces in these videos, and the computing power 
required to measure facial expressions in these videos. For these reasons, 
caution is needed when interpreting the results and meaning of findings based 
on the facial recognition software. Future research is required to fully test the 
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relationship between facial expressions, actual feelings, and how one displays 
these feelings in their face during interactions with others. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
 This research identifies a specific chain of events that leads people to 
rely on subtle features of their surroundings when deciding how to promote 
collective action in groups. Social exchange theory has identified what features 
of networks affect the attitudes and behaviors of people in groups (Molm et 
al. 2007; Lawler et al. 2008); recent work has shown when these effects happen 
in networks (Kuwabara 2011). I extend this line of research by explaining how 
features of social context affect group dynamics. 
 Identity control theory (ICT) proposes that people want to control how 
they perceive their surroundings. They do this by comparing their perceptions 
with some identity standard and deciding how best to reduce differences 
between the two.  Identities are defined by ICT as sets of meanings that we 
organize into coherent schemas within our minds. ICT broadly defines identity 
as meanings that relate to groups (e.g. gender), roles within these groups (e.g. 
occupation), or the values held by actors regardless of the roles they occupy 
(e.g. goals). The latter of these identities is where identity control theory 
intersects with social exchange theory. 
 Social exchange theory assumes that actors begin group tasks with the 
goal of accumulating resources for themselves. If we assume that goals have 
meaning for actors, then it follows that resource accumulation represents an 
identity standard as defined by identity control theory. ICT proposes that 
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actors will behave in ways to match their perceptions with identity standards. 
Thus, changing how actors perceive their interactions with others may change 
the means by which actors achieve their goals. For my studies, collective 
action is the optimal strategy for actors to gain resources during group tasks. 
The proposed theory of context in social exchange explains how features of 
social context affect the means by which actors promote collective action in 
groups, leading to trust, commitment and cohesion between group members. 
Future Research  
 The proposed theory has implications for research on groups in 
sociology. Specifically, it shows that the exchange of resources between people 
represents an expression of one’s attempt to control how they perceive their 
experiences. Results in support of my proposed theory show that perceptions 
of self and others significantly impacts what actors do with resources in 
groups. And, what actors do with resources significantly affects their 
perceptions of the group as a cohesive entity. Not all features of social context 
have the same effect, however. In my last study, I found evidence that actors 
generally ignored the effects of group context when deciding how to behave in 
groups. These results show that people are not passively responding to their 
surroundings, but actively selecting particular contextual features and 
ignoring others as they organize their perceptions of experience in groups.  
!  121
 If context affects how actors behave in groups, then perhaps a wider 
range of features that define social context would affect the means by which 
actors promote collective action during group tasks. My proposed theory of 
context in social exchange could provide an important link between other 
sociological constructs (e.g. status or power) and the formation of social 
solidarity in groups.  
 For example, could status differences in groups affect how much actors 
rely on generosity or punishment in groups? The salience assumption of status 
characteristics theory assumes that actors will initially define features of 
people as task relevant, even when these features have nothing to do with a 
particular task (e.g. gender differences of group members during gender 
neutral tasks). My proposed theory explains how actors rely on subtle features 
of context to promote collective action in groups. It follows that these actors 
may rely on features such as status characteristics during social exchange 
tasks. Thus, my proposed theory provides a link that could explain how status 
organizing processes affect the formation of social solidarity in groups. 
 In a second example, could perceptions of social context by actors 
affect who has power over whom in various networks of social exchange? 
Network exchange theory defines power as the capacity to get what one wants 
even when others resist. This capacity is located within network structures 
that delimit who may get what resources from whom in groups. Thus, it is the 
distribution of resources in networks that creates power differences between 
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group members. According to my proposed theory, changing the subtle 
features of social context within these networks alter what actors do with 
resources in groups. It follows that context may affect the distribution of 
resources in networks over time, leading to changes in levels of power that 
form between group members. We need additional research to fully 
understand when actors decide to rely on features of social context and how 
this reliance affects a broad range of sociological constructs. The proposed 




Appendix A - Registration Materials 
Recruitment Advertisement 
— 
The sociology department is looking for undergraduate volunteers to participate in a 
social science experiment.You are guaranteed $15 for 1-hour of your time. In 
addition, you will have an opportunity to win $100 in a raffle. 
Sign-up online: http://ter.ps/labstudy 
Or e-mail the study coordinator: mposard@gmail.com 
— 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Registration System, Screen 2   Registration System, Screen 2 
Toward top of page     Towered the bottom of the page  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Registration System, Screen 2 
Toward the bottom of the page 
Registration System, Screen 3 
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E-mail Reminder Sent to Participants 
— 
FROM: Marek N. Posard 
TO: Marek N. Posard 
BCC: Experimental Participants Here  
SUBJECT: REMINDER: Experiment Tomorrow (DAY, MONTH DATE HERE) @ TIME 
HERE 
Hello! 
You have registered for an experiment tomorrow @ TIME HERE. The experiment will take 
place in Computer Lab #5 inside LeFrak Hall.  Just go up the ramp and you will see a sign 
directing you to this computer lab. 
You are guaranteed $15 for under 1 hour of your time. You could also win a raffle where the 
prize is $100. 
Your participation is critical to this experiment and we are looking forward to your arrival! 
Please note: it is very important that you come on time tomorrow - otherwise we may 
have to send other people in your group home.  
Thanks, 
Marek 
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Appendix C - Study 1 Materials 
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Group Task Screens     Group Task Screens 
Cooperative Personality Competitive Personality                                
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Group Task Screens     Group Task Screens 




Appendix D - Study 2 Materials 
Study Instruction Screens Study Instruction Screens                                          
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Group Task Screens     Group Task Screens 
Collaborators as Partners    Competitors as Partners 
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Group Task Screens     Group Task Screens 





Appendix E - Study 3 Materials 
Study Instruction Screens Study Instruction Screens                                          
Cooperative Condition Competitors Condition                                              
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Study Instruction Screens Study Instruction Screens                                          
Cooperative Condition Competitive Condition                                              
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Study Instruction Screens Study Instruction Screens                                          
Cooperative Condition Competitors Condition  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Study Instruction Screens Study Instruction Screens                                          
Cooperative Condition Competitors Condition                                              
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Cooperative Condition, Study 3    Competitive Condition, Study 3
Group Task Screens      Group Task Screens  
!  158








If born outside of the United States, what country where you born in?
During your time at the University of Maryland, how many of these types of experiments have you completed
(including this one)?
Final Questions
The UMD Student Crisis Fund helps our students discover the very essence of community - not only to spur one
another on during ordinary times, but to lift up their fellow struggling student during extraordinary times of
crisis.
Would you like to donate a percentage of your tokens to the UMD Student Crisis Fund? If these tokens are
chosen in the lottery, we will donate $100 for students in need at the University of Maryland.
 
What percentage of
your tokens do you
want to donate to
the UMD Student
Crisis Fund?
Did you view your group as more competitive or collaborative?
 
I viewed my group
as more...
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Competitive Collaboratorative
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Individualism. Competition. Results.
Teamwork. Collaboration. Results.
Logo A: Individualism. Competition. Results.   
Logo B: Teamwork. Cooperation. Results.   




What are the core values of Looking Glass Incorporated?
Which one of these logos did you see on your computer screen during the group project?
Ccompetitively Collaboratively
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
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We told you that the study today was designed to look at factors that influence how people work together on
group projects.
Do you think there might be any other purpose to the study? If so, please explain.
How much effort did you put into this experiment?
Very little        A lot









Agree Agree Strongly Agree
This study is looking at how the social context influences your behavior and general perceptions of yourself and
whether these perceptions mediate the degree to which people view the group and networks of social exchange
as a whole in different ways.
 
Just so you know: All of your partners were in fact real people.
Individualism. Competition. Results.
Teamwork. Collaboration. Results.
Logo A: Individualism. Competition. Results.   
Logo B: Teamwork. Cooperation. Results.   




What are the core values of Looking Glass Incorporated?
Which one of these logos did you see on your computer screen during the group project?
Ccompetitively Collaboratively
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Appendix F - Questionnaire 
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Not at all like you




Not at all like you




Not at all like you





You will see statements that describe some people. Please indicate for each description whether that person is
very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like you?
It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative; to do things one’s own way.
It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and expensive things. 
Living in secure surroundings is important to this person; to avoid anything that might be dangerous.
It is important to this person to have a good time; to “spoil” oneself.
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Not at all like you




Not at all like you




Not at all like you




Not at all like you




Not at all like you
It is important to this person to help the people nearby; to care for their well-being.
Being very successful is important to this person; to have people recognize one's achievements.
Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have an exciting life.
It is important to this person to always behave properly; to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.
Looking after the environment is important to this person; to care for nature and save life resources. 
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Not at all like you




Not at all like you
Tradition is important to this person; to follow the customs handed down by one’s religion or family. 
Post Study Questions
What is the subject ID number that we gave you in this study? (e.g. 36)






Easy Somewhat Easy Easy Very Easy
How competitive or cooperative are you?
 
I am more of a...
Next, we would like to know your impressions of Participant #1
Competitive Person Cooperative Person
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
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How much did you trust Participant #1?
Not at all      A lot
In general, how would you describe your feelings towards Participant #1 during the experiment?
Very negative      Very positive
How committed were you to Participant #1?
Not at all      A lot









others in the group?
Next, we would like to know your impressions of Participant #2
How much did you trust Participant #2?
Not at all      A lot
In general, how would you describe your feelings towards Participant #2 during the experiment?
Very negative      Very positive
 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
 
!  166
How committed were you to Participant #2?
Not at all      A lot









others in the group?
Next, we would like to know about your relationship with BOTH PARTICIPANTS.
How much do you feel that you and the other participants worked well together?
Not at all      Very much
How committed were you to the other participants?
Not at all      Very much
How much did you trust the other participants?
Not at all      Very much
In general, how would you describe your feelings towards the other participants?
Very negative      Very positive
 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
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Most people can be trusted
You can't be too careful
It depends
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing
with people?
Think about the relationship you and the other participants had during the group task. How would you describe
the relationship on each of the following?
Distant or Close
Distant        Close
Cooperative or Conflictual
Cooperative        Conflictual
Integrating or Fragmenting
Integrating        Fragmenting
Solid or Fragile
Solid        Fragile
Divisive or Cohesive
Divisive        Cohesive
Team-Oriented or Self-Oriented
Team-
Oriented        
Self-
Oriented
Which of the following best describes how you thought about yourself and the others in your group during the
experiment? Pick one answer.
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Competitors, working against each other.
Separate individuals, each working for ourselves.
Separate individuals, but working together.
A group, a team, working together
On the whole, do you think your interests were in conflict with the others in your group or were your interests in
agreement?
In Conflict        
In
Agreement
Would you say that the motives of the others in your group were generally competitive or cooperative?
Competitve​        Cooperative
How much did you feel you were a part of a "group" with the other two during the experiment?
Not at all        Plenty
How much influence did you have on your own outcomes?
Not at all        Plenty
Feelings





I did not feel this way I felt this way.









Remember those questions that you answered earlier? If you had to guess, how would the other participants
rate you on these questions.
If we asked the other participants to rate you for each description, would they choose: very much
like her/him, like her/him, somewhat like her/him, not like her/him, or not at all like her/him?
For each description, the other participants in my group would rate me as....







Not at all like
her/him
It is important to this
person to think up new
ideas and be creative; to
do things one’s own way.
  
It is important to this
person to be rich; to have





to this person; to avoid
anything that might be
dangerous.
  
It is important to this
person to have a good
time; to “spoil” oneself.
  
It is important to this
person to help the people







Being very successful is
important to this person;




risks are important to this
person; to have an
exciting life.
  
It is important to this
person to always behave






to this person; to care for
nature and save life
resources.
  
Tradition is important to
this person; to follow the
customs handed down by
one’s religion or family.
  
Demographics
What is your name?
What is your University of Maryland ID Number?
What year were you born?















What is your gender?
What is your race?





What is your primary major?
Are you in a fraternity or sorority?
Where you born outside of the United States?





If born outside of the United States, what country where you born in?
During your time at the University of Maryland, how many of these types of experiments have you completed
(including this one)?
Final Questions
The UMD Student Crisis Fund helps our students discover the very essence of community - not only to spur one
another on during ordinary times, but to lift up their fellow struggling student during extraordinary times of
crisis.
Would you like to donate a percentage of your tokens to the UMD Student Crisis Fund? If these tokens are
chosen in the lottery, we will donate $100 for students in need at the University of Maryland.
 
What percentage of
your tokens do you
want to donate to
the UMD Student
Crisis Fund?
Did you view your group as more competitive or collaborative?
 
I viewed my group
as more...
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Competitive Collaboratorative
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
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